Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy

Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference
Papers

Research Report No. 23/2007

Purity Lost: The Paradoxical Face of the New
Transnational Legal Body
Oren Perez

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe
Recommended Citation
Perez, Oren, "Purity Lost: The Paradoxical Face of the New Transnational Legal Body" (2007). Comparative Research in Law & Political
Economy. Research Paper No. 23/2007.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/240

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER 23/2007
Oren Perez

Purity Lost: The Paradoxical Face of the New Transnational
Legal Body
EDITORS: Peer Zumbansen (Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Director, Comparative Research in
Law and Political Economy, York University), John W. Cioffi (University of California at Riverside),
Lindsay Krauss (Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Production Editor)

CLPE Research Paper 23/2007
Vol. 03 No. 04 (2007)
Oren Perez

PURITY LOST: THE PARADOXICAL FACE OF THE NEW
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL BODY
Forthcoming in Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2008)
Abstract: Modern international law seems to be in disarray. The classic
doctrines of international law, with their focus on sovereignty, state
consent, custom and treaty, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for
many of the practices and institutional structures that fill the global legal
universe. The contemporary legal terrain is characterized by overlapping
jurisdictions, inconsistent doctrinal interpretations and competing
worldviews. But what are the social implications of the deepening
fragmentation and increasing complexity of the global legal system? Some
observers see these phenomena as a new global risk, which requires urgent
collective response. Global constitutionalisation is put forward in this
context as a possible and appropriate response. Using the notions of purity
and paradox the article develops an analytic framework in which the
increasing complexity of the international legal system can be elucidated.
The complexification of the global legal system is described in terms of a
move from purity to impurity and from singular to multiple paradoxicality.
The article uses examples from diverse fields of law – ranging from the
WTO, the International Criminal Court, to the ICC International Court of
Arbitration and the World Wide Web Consortium Platform for Privacy
Preferences Project to develop this argument. Drawing on this framework
the article considers the consequences of the complexification of the
global legal system in terms of its stability and legitimacy. Rather than
seeing the messy nature of modern international law as a risk the article
postulates it as an evolutionary achievement which extends the horizon of
possibilities through which the international legal system can react to
social pressures. Drawing on ideas from systems theory and ecology the
article argues that the attempts to purify the international legal system
through appeal to grand theories - constitutional, moral or other - could
have negative social consequences. The article explores in this context an

i

alternative institutional model – non-hierarchical reflexivity - which
embraces, rather than oppose, the innate paradoxicality of modern
international law.

Keywords: Transnational Law, International Economic Law, International
Legal Theory, Paradox, Complexity, Global Constitutionalism
JEL classification: K10, K33
Author Contact: Oren Perez
Bar Ilan University, Faculty of Law
Ramat-Gan, 52900 Israel
Email: perezo@mail.biu.ac.il

ii

PURITY LOST: THE PARADOXICAL FACE OF THE NEW
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL BODY
Oren Perez*
Evolution means nothing but growth in the widest sense of that word.
Reproduction, of course, is merely one of the incidents of growth. And
what is growth? Not mere increase. Spencer says it is the passage from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous — or, if we prefer English to
Spencerese — diversification.
Charles Pierce, Collected Papers (1931) section 1.174
"The fact is that complexity is self-potentiating. Complex systems
generally engender further principles of order that produce yet greater
complexities. Complex organisms create an impetus towards complex
societies, complex machines towards complex industries, complex
armaments towards complex armies. And the world's complexity means
there is, now and always, more to reality than our science – or for that
matter our speculation and our philosophy – is able to dream of".
Nicholas Rescher, Nature and Understanding:
The Metaphysics and Method of Science (2000) 24-25.

I. INTRODUCTION
Modern international law seems to be in disarray. The classic doctrines of
international law, with their focus on sovereignty, state consent, custom
and treaty, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for many of the
practices and institutional structures that fill the global legal universe. The
*

Part of this paper was written while I was at Osgoode Hall Law School as a Fellow of
the CLPE Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Network in the fall of
2006. My thanks to Osgoode Hall Law School and to CLPE Director, Peer Zumbansen,
for the invitation and the warm reception during my stay. Earlier versions of this paper
were presented at the Putting Theory to Practice public lectures series at Osgoode in
October 2006, at the Institute for International Law and Public Policy, Temple University
Beasley School of Law, September 2006, and at the conference Sovereignty, Supremacy,
Subsidiarity: the Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law, an International
Conference in Honour of Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, the Hebrew University, Faculty of Law,
June 2006. I want to thank the participants of these events for their comments. I also want
to thank Jeffrey Dunoff and Peer Zumbansen for their helpful comments on an earlier
version of this article.
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contemporary legal terrain seems to be characterized by overlapping
jurisdictions, inconsistent doctrinal interpretations and competing
worldviews. But what are the social implications of the deepening
fragmentation and increasing complexity of the global legal system? Some
observers argue that these phenomena constitute a new global risk, which
requires urgent collective response. Global constitutionalisation is put
forward in this context as a possible and appropriate reaction.1
Using the notions of purity and paradox the article develops an analytic
framework in which the increasing complexity of the international legal
system can be elucidated. Drawing on this framework the article considers
the consequences of the complexification of the global legal system in
terms of its stability and legitimacy. Rather than seeing the messy and
complex nature of modern international law as a risk this article depicts it
as an evolutionary achievement which extends the horizon of possibilities
through which the international legal system can react to social pressures.
The attempts to purify the international legal system by appealing to grand
theories - constitutional, moral or other - are ill-conceived. First, because
they fail to recognize the innate paradoxicality of the law. Second, because
they constitute a threat to the legitimacy and resilience of the global legal
system. The article explores in this context alternative institutional models
which draw upon – rather than oppose - the complexity and paradoxicality
of modern international law.
The article proceeds as follows. It opens with a discussion of the
Westphalian scheme of validity (what I will call 'the purity thesis') (section
1

This was the approach of two former Presidents of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"), Judge Stephen M. Schwebel and Judge Gilbert Guillaume. Both expressed their
concern of the proliferation of international judicial bodies and the increasing
fragmentation of the international legal order and suggested, as a solution, to extend and
reaffirm, through various measures, the powers and international status of the ICJ. See:
Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Judge
Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice, 26 October 1999,
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresidentGA54_19991026.htm; Address
by Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice to the United
Nations
General
Assembly,
27
October
2000,
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident_Guillaume_SixthCommittee_20
001027.htm.
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II). It then proceeds to consider the invocation of the Westphalian scheme
within new international regimes such as the World Trade Organization
and the International Criminal Court, arguing that the Westphalian scheme
creates irresolvable paradoxes within these regimes (section III). To
facilitate this argument the article develops a model of paradoxicality in
philosophy and law. Section IV explores alternative forms of validation
which are claiming to fill the normative void that was caused by the
demise of the Westphalian model. On close inspection these alternative
principles emerge as equally problematic in terms of their coherence or
completeness. Section V takes a step back by looking into the history of
international legal theory. Historical examination demonstrates that
international law has never been pure. I show that this impurity closely
parallels the problem of grounding in philosophy, especially as reflected in
the semantic paradox entitled 'the Truth-Teller Paradox'. The last part of
this section explores the role of paradoxes in the dynamics of autonomous
and self-organizing systems (such as law). But what then is unique in the
current state of international law? This question is addressed in section VI
which argues that what is unique in the current system of international law
is not the impurity of our forms of validation - but the proliferation of
multiple, paradoxical, validating techniques, which are invoked,
simultaneously, at the forefront of the international legal body. The
contemporary universe of transnational law is characterized by a shift
from (imaginary) purity to multiple paradoxicality – a process of
polymorphosis. But what are the practical consequences this process? The
remainder of this article explores the sociological implications of this
process, drawing on ideas from systems theory and ecology. It concludes
with a discussion of the false promise of global constitutionalism, setting it
against an alternative institutional model: non-hierarchical reflexivity.

II. PURITY: THE WESTPHALIAN NARRATIVE
The pure conception of international law aspired to provide a complete
and coherent account of the structure of international law. In particular it
argued that international law regulates – in a complete and coherent

4
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fashion - the creation of new (international) norms.2. A succinct
description of the Westphalian narrative can be found in an article
published by Leo Gross in 1948:3
”The Peace of Westphalia… marks the end of an epoch which leads from
the old into the new world… In the political field it marked man's
abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his
option for a new system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity
of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free
from any external earthly authority. The idea of an authority or
organization above the sovereign states is no longer... This new system
rests on international law and the balance of power, a law operating
between rather than above states and a power operating between rather
than above states".
In the legal domain the Westphalian narrative was translated into an
articulated doctrine of validity and authority. This doctrine – in the form
explicated here – constitutes what I call – the pure vision of international
law.4 One of the most eloquent advocates of the purity thesis was Josef
Kunz. Kunz argued that international law regulates the creation of
2

For an historical account of the development of the theory of international law, see, for
example, Martti Koskenniemi, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001) chapters 5 & 6 and Dinah Shelton, Normative
Hierarchy in International Law, 100 American Journal of International Law 291 (2006).
3

Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 American Journal of International
Law 20, 28-29 (1948). The Westphalian narrative was discussed in numerous articles and
books. See, for example, Amos S. Hershey, History of International Law Since the Peace
of Westphalia, 6 American Journal of International Law 30 (1912) and Andreas Osiander,
Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 International
Organization 251 (2001).

4

This vision can be associated of course with the positivistic school whose most obvious
representative in the early 20th century is Hans Kelsen. See, Martti Koskenniemi,
Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law, 8 European Journal of
International Law 215, 216-217 (1997) and Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the
Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its
Problems 15 European Journal of International Law 523, 548 (2004).
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international norms through two, hierarchically ordered, procedures:
custom and treaty: "Treaty and custom are two different, independent
procedures for creating international legal norms".5 Both are based on the
notion of state consent. Custom, Kunz argued, is the hierarchically higher
form of creating norms of international law. "Custom-produced general
international law is the basis; the customary principle of 'Pacta sunt
servanda' is the reason for validity of all particular international law
created by the treaty procedure".6 International law also lays down the
conditions under which the procedure of custom creates valid norms of
general international law. These two conditions are usage and opinio
juris.7 Jus cogens norms, to the extent that they have not been codified in
treaties, constitute another type of customary law.8 This legal articulation
of the Westphalian narrative seeks to provide a complete and seemingly
coherent account of the way in which international law regulates the
creation of new norms. This account, although without explicit
hierarchical order, also underlies article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which states that international disputes
5

Joseph. L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 The American Journal
of International Law 662, 665 (1953).
6

Kunz, ibid, 665. The status of the norm pacta sunt servanda as a norm of general
international law is probably beyond doubt. Kunz argues that it constitutes "the axiom,
postulate and categorical imperative of the science of international law" and is
"undoubtedly a positive norm of general international law" Joseph. L. Kunz, The
Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda 39 The American Journal of
International Law 180 (1945). Its status received further recognition in the text of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna, 23 May 1969, entered into
force on 27 January 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (see in
particular the definitions of “ratification,” “acceptance,” “approval,” and “accession” in
Article 2 of the Convention). See also: Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to
Law and Globalization, 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 485, 487 (2005).
7

Kunz, supra note 5, at 665. On the interpretation of these two conditions see further,
Kammerhofer, supra note 4.
8

See, Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-party States
64 Law and Contemporary Problems 13, 57 (2001) (with respect to the prohibitions
against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).

6

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

should be resolved primarily through the application of international
conventions and international custom.9

III. PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
CURRENT INVOCATIONS OF THE WESTPHALIAN
NARRATIVE
In describing the demise of the Westphalian legal order writers usually
refer to processes of norm-development in non-state arenas, to the
increasing importance of non-state actors such as Non Governmental
Organizations ('NGOs') and Multinational Enterprises ('MNEs'), to the
law-making powers of international tribunals and to the emergence of
general principles of global humanitarian law.10 However, despite the
continuing talk about the demise of the Westphalian order its underlying
principles of state sovereignty and state consent continue to play an
important role in the structure of various international legal regimes. It is
interesting, therefore, to consider the way in which the Westphalian
scheme of validity (as postulated by Joseph Kunz and Leo Gross) is
invoked in contemporary treaty regimes. This section explores this
question in the context of two key treaty instruments: the World Trade
Organization ('WTO') and the International Criminal Court ('ICC'). I will
argue that the invocation of the Westphalian validity doctrine in these
treaties generates deep inconsistencies that undermine its claim to provide
coherent and complete foundations for modern international law.

9

Available at the ICJ website: http://www.icj-cij.org (basic documents). It is also echoed
in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention which states that "A treaty is void if, at the time
of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law", thus
reflecting the hierarchical order postulated by Kunz.
10

For a general discussion of the demise of the Westphalian paradigm see: Gunther
Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, In G. Teubner (ed.),
Global Law Without a State, , pp. 3-30 (1997) and Berman, supra note 6.
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Exposing the paradoxes and inconsistencies associated with the
Westphalian doctrinal apparatus requires that I first elucidate the meaning
of paradox in both logic and law. This theoretical detour also sets the
ground for the broader thesis of this article – which explores the dynamic
of the global legal system (sections V and VI).

A. DETOUR: PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LAW
1. PARADOXES: A GENERAL EXPOSITION
What do we mean by the concept of "paradox"? The term ‘paradox’ is
sometimes used informally to designate a statement which conflicts with
the common view.11 Within the realm of law, this understanding can be
applied to any legal claim which challenges a received legal opinion. I am
interested in other forms of paradoxes, which do not reflect a transitory
interpretative dispute, but rather expose a deeper social and linguistic
problematic.
The philosophical literature offers various definitions of this more
challenging understanding of the concept of paradox. Thus one view
focuses on the deep inconsistency associated with paradoxes. Nicholas
Rescher, for example, defines paradox as a "set of propositions that are
individually plausible but collectively inconsistent".12 Another view
emphasises the paradox’s problematical conclusion, taking paradox as "an
argument that begins with premises that appear to be clearly true, that
11

Thus, the definition of paradox in the Oxford dictionary opens with: "Statement
contrary to received opinion". See The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English
(1964, 5h ed) at 880.

12

See Nicholas Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution (2001) at xxi.
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proceeds according to inference rules that appear to be valid, but that ends
in contradiction".13 Other thinkers, such as W.V. Quine, have highlighted
the reasoning pattern that generates the paradox. ‘An antinomy produces a
self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some
tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and
henceforward be avoided or revised’.14 In light of these general reflections
it is possible to distinguish between two major types of paradoxes.15
Paradoxes of coherence expose a deep inconsistency in some well-defined
set of sentences or propositions.16 Semantical paradoxes involve the
notions of truth, falsity and reference, and challenge the way we reason
with these notions.17
To get a better sense of the notion of paradox let us consider a specific and
famous example - the paradox of the liar.18 Consider the following
sentence
13

Charles S. Chihara, The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation 88 The
Philosophical Review 590 (1979). For a similar view see: RM Sainsbury, Paradoxes
(1995) at 1
14

15

WV Quine, The Ways of Paradox (1966) at 7.
This distinction is not exhaustive, see Rescher, supra note 12, at 72-73. .

16

I use the term ‘deep inconsistency’ to distinguish such paradoxes from mere
contradictions. The difference between the two terms lies in the way in which paradoxes
make the contradiction appear inescapable. See Peter Suber, The Paradox of SelfAmendment 7 Stanford Literature Review 53 (1990). I will sometimes use the term
‘logical paradoxes’ to refer to this type of paradoxes.

17

Another useful taxonomy is Quine’s distinction between ‘veridical’ and ‘falsidical’
paradoxes (see Quine, supra note 14, at 4-5). Veridical paradox is, in effect, a truthtelling argument or proof; it establishes that some proposition is true or false (eg, the
Barber Paradox). Falsidical paradox, in contrast, ‘is one whose proposition not only
seems at first absurd but also is false, there being fallacy in the purported proof’. A
typical example is Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise.

18

The discussion of semantical paradoxes involves of course the question of the meaning
of truth and falsity. However, because of the deep controversy that exists within
philosophy with respect to the meaning of truth I decided not to delve into this question.
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K1
This sentence is false (we can also present this sentence in the
following format: ‘K1 K1 is false’).
K1 produces a paradoxical loop: if it is true, it is false; and if it is false, it is
true. This sentence refuses, so it seems, to be attributed with a stable truth
value. It is possible to structure a similar paradox which is heteroreferential rather than self-referential. Consider the following set of
sentences which, following Roy Sorensen, I will call the ‘looped liar’:19
Plato: what Socrates says is true
Socrates: What Plato says is false
Like the liar sentence it is impossible to attribute stable and coherent truth
values to this pair.20
A feature common to the 'self-referential liar' and the 'looped liar' is their
semantic instability: their perpetual oscillation between truth and falsity. 21
The ‘Liar Paradox’ and the 'looped liar' seem to suffer from some kind of
semantic pathology, which is unsettling because of the way in which it

One can find within philosophy five major theories of truth: the Correspondence Theory;
the Semantic Theory; the Deflationary (or Minimalist) Theory; the Coherence Theory,
and the Pragmatic Theory. For a useful introduction to this debate, see Bradley Dowden,
‘Truth’ in Fieser and Dowden (eds), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004),
available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/truth.htm. Semantical paradoxes create a problem,
though, for each of these theories. One initial assumption which I do make is that
statements can be either true or false (the law of excluded middle).
19

Roy Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the
Mind (2003) at 211. This version of the liar can be traced back to the medieval thinker
John Buridan (1295-1356). Sorensen, ibid , at 201-215.

20

One can construct a liar-like paradox which is non-circular. See, Stephen Yablo,
Paradox without Self-Reference, 53 Analysis 251 (1993).

21

Hans Herzberger, Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox, 79 The Journal of
Philosophy 479, 482 (1982).
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challenges our conventional grammatical structures, and our usage of
basic notions such as truth and reference.22

2. PARADOXES IN LAW: INCOHERENCE AND PARALYSIS
Logical and semantical paradoxes have existed for more than 2000 years.
Early versions of the liar paradox can be found in the Christian scriptures
and in Greek and medieval writings.23 These paradoxes have not, however,
brought human thought to a stand-still. While philosophers have continued
to deliberate about the proper solution to the Liar paradox people have
continued to use the notions of truth and falsity in their every-day
reasoning, and scientists have continued their search for true descriptions.
However the presence of paradoxes and deep inconsistencies in the law
seems more threatening, calling into question the capacity of the law to
fulfil its function as a reliable arbiter of social conflicts and a source of
normative expectations. Paradoxes can undermine these legal functions,
either by leading to paralysis and deadlocks or by generating chaos and
indeterminacy, causing people to replace the law with other forms of
governance.
Thus, the puzzle of legal paradoxicality deserves closer scrutiny. The first
step toward the resolution of this puzzle is to identify the proper referent
of legal paradoxes. I think that the most suitable candidate for that role is
what I will call a legal set: a sequence of sentences which invoke,
explicitly or implicitly, the legal code (the distinction between legal and
illegal). A legal set may include three major types of normative sentences:
norms, norm-propositions (statements about norms), or meta-propositions
(statements about the entire legal system).24 These types of normative
22

See also Adam Reiger, ‘The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence’ (2001) 54
Erkenntnis 195.
23

Sorensen, supra note 19, at 197. Other paradoxes such as the paradoxes of motion,
attributed to Zeno are also ancient, see Sorensen, ibid, at 49. Sorensen's book provides a
comprehensive discussion of the history of paradox.

24

See also: Jose Juan Moreso, Putting Legal Objectivity in its Place. In Analisi e
diritto edited by G. Giappichelli, at 243 (2004).
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sentences may be: prescriptive (ought to), permissive (may) or prohibitive
(may not).25 Law includes additional types of norms, such as norms
conferring public or private powers⎯ competence norms (the competence
to issue other norms) or determinative norms (norms that define certain
concepts).26 One way in which a legal set may be formed is to extract a
segment from the law’s printed history (understood as the entire genealogy
of rules and case law pertaining to a particular legal domain).27 A paradox
arises whenever a legal set, or a portion of it, is self-contradictory, and
when this self-contradiction is supported by apparently good reasons.28
Two primary features of legal paradoxes distinguish them from logical and
semantical paradoxes. These differences influence, as I will demonstrate,
the practical consequences of paradoxes in law. The first distinctive
feature of legal paradoxes concerns the unique composition of the legal
25

Sven Ove Hansson, Situationist Deontic Logic 26 Journal of Philosophical Logic 423,
428 (1997). 'All Israeli citizens are obligated not to emit sewage into the sea' is an
example of a prohibitive norm. 'Israeli law prohibits the emission of sewage into the sea'
is an example of norm proposition; it is a proposition about the existence of a legal norm.
'The Israeli legal system is a combination of the common law and civil law traditions' is a
meta-proposition. Two other normative types which are mentioned in the literature are: 'it
is gratuitous that' and 'it is optional that'. Something is gratuitous if and only if it is not
obligatory, and it is optional if and only neither it nor its negation is obligatory. See,
McNamara, Paul, "Deontic Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2006
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/logic-deontic/, section 1.2.

26

For these further types see Eugenio Bulygin, On Norms of Competence, 11 Law and
Philosophy 201 (1992).

27

But one can also form a legal set by using second-order observations of the law – for
example, by giving an account of a certain theory of law. Theorizing in law reflects either
an attempt to study ‘how far principles, notions, and rules for decision-making can be
generalized’ (Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System (2004) 54-5) or a meta-attempt to
expose the general structure of the law. For more on the role and nature of legal theories,
see David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory 83
Northwestern University Law Review 10 (1989).

28

A different but related problem is indeterminacy. See, further section V(2) below and
the discussion of the truth-teller paradox.
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set. Because legal sets may include both norms and propositional
statements, their contradictory form is not limited to conflicting
attributions of truth and falsity.29 This is because norms are usually
thought to lack truth-value.30 The second distinctive feature of legal
paradoxes, to which I will return later in sections V and VI, relates to their
dynamic quality. It reflects the fact that law is a social system and not a
static register of norms. In other words legal paradoxes influence the
world of action, and should be examined with this in mind.
But let me delay for a moment the discussion of the systemic impact of
legal paradoxes and consider them in light of the peculiarities of a legal
set. I do not intend to provide here a formal account of the way in which
legal-oriented sentences can relate to, or contradict, each other.31 For my
purposes, it will suffice to give an intuitive account of what is unique in
legal inconsistency, and provide a few paradigmatic examples. A legal set
may be inconsistent, first, when it can be shown to contain contradictory
norms. Norms or rules can be contradictory, for example, when one rule
permits what another forbids, when two rules issue contradictory
directives (which cannot be simultaneously complied with).32 A further
form of inconsistency arises when one can find within a legal set
conflicting interpretations of the same legal concept. Another form of
inconsistency, which is unique to law, arises when one can show that a
29

However, norm-propositions, propositions that state that a given action is obligatory
(required), permitted (allowed), or forbidden (prohibited) according to a given norm, can
have truth value.
30

As Henrik von Wright puts it: "Norms as prescriptions of human conduct… may be
pronounced (un)reasonable, (un)just, or (in)valid when judged by some standards which
are themselves normative – but not true or false"; Henrik von Wright, Is There a Logic of
Norms, 4 Ratio Juris 265, 266 (1991).

31

Deontic logic represents an attempt to provide such a formalistic account. However,
this formalistic presentation is not really necessary for the arguments presented here. See,
eg, von Wright, ibid and McNamara supra note 25.

32

See von Wright, ibid, at 270-1. This form of inconsistency could give rise to
conflicting normative expectations.
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legal set includes contradictory assignments of validity. The notion of
validity plays, as I will argue later, a unique role in the law, something
akin to the notion of truth in logic. It is the validity of the law that makes
its normative statements binding.33
Let us consider two examples of legal paradoxes. Consider first a legal
version of the liar paradox. I follow the conventional Deontic notation
with OBp denoting 'it is obligatory that p'.
It is obligatory not to follow this rule. (This can also be presented
O1
as: O1 O~O1)
This statement (interpreted as a norm rather than norm-proposition) is
clearly self-contradictory. It generates conflicting directives. It is similar to
the following prescription:
O2
bars.

It is obligatory not to smoke in bars and it is obligatory to smoke in

The self-contradictory nature of O1 and O2 makes it impossible to satisfy
them – their satisfaction set is empty. Impossibility is the pathological
symptom that accompanies normative contradiction.34
33

Note, however, that since legal sets may also include ‘normal’ propositions, and may
invoke classical reasoning patterns (Even if this is done only implicitly and nonexclusively) they can also be contradictory in the sense in which this notion is used in
propositional logic (ie, through inconsistent attributions of truth and falsity). On the role
of classical deductive patterns in legal reasoning see: Arend Soeteman, Legal logic? Or
can we do without? 11 Artificial Intelligence and Law 197 (2003).

34

I follow Vranas here; see Peter B. M. Vranas, New foundations for deontic logic: A
preliminary
sketch"
Unpublished
Manuscript,
available
at
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~vranas/Homesite/papers/deonticweb.doc
(2002), at
section 3. Note however, that while O1 and O2 are self-contradictory, a norm-proposition
that describes a norm which is self-contradictory can be true and non contradictory. See
Lennart Aqvist, Interpretations of Deontic Logic 73 Mind 246, 249 (1964). It is also
possible to construct looped contradictory obligations with similar consequences:
O3

You ought to follow rule O4.
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The paradoxes of law tend however to be more subtle than these examples.
So let us consider another less blunt example. This example follows the
Greek story of Protagoras and Euathlus. I will follow the story as it was
told by Aulus Gellius.35 Protagoras ("the keenest of all sophists")36 taught
rhetoric and argumentation. Euathlus, who wished to be instructed in the
art of oratory and the pleading of causes (what is called law today) became
a pupil of Protagoras. It was agreed between the two that Euathlus will pay
his fee after he won his first case.37 After having been a pupil and follower
of Protagoras for some time, and having made considerable progress in the
study of oratory, Euathlus nevertheless had not undertaken any cases.
Protagoras decided to demand his fee according to the contract, and he
brought a suit against Euathlus.
Protagoras and Euathlus presented their arguments before the court.
Protagoras began as follows:38

O4

You ought not to follow rule O3.

35

Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius (c. 150 C.E.), trans. John C. Rolfe, 3
vols., The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, rev. ed., vol. I, Book V, x,
pp. 405-09 (1946). All the following quotes are from Gellius, ibid. This account was
written roughly 600 years after the events (if they indeed occur) since it is assumed that
Protagoras lived from 492 to 421 B.C.E. See, J. A. Davison, Protagoras, Democritus,
and Anaxagoras 3 The Classical Quarterly 33, 38 (1953). This paradox was discussed by
other ancient writers. See, for details Jordan Howard Sobel, The Law Student and his
Teacher LIII Theoria 1 (1987).

36

Gellius, ibid at 405. Protagoras has drafted the constitution of Thuria and taught in the
Sicilian School of rhetoric. See, Davison, ibid, at 33.
37

Gellius writes that Euathlus paid Protagoras half of the fee before beginning his
lessons, and agreed to pay the remaining half "on the day when he first pleaded before
jurors and won his case", ibid at 407.

38

Gellius, ibid at 407.
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“Let me tell you, most foolish of youths, that in either event you will have
to pay what I am demanding, whether judgment be pronounced for or
against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be due me in
accordance with the verdict, because I have won; but if the decision be in
your favour, the money will be due me according to our contract, since
you will have won a case”.
To this Euathlus replied:39
“I might have met this sophism of yours, tricky as it is, by not pleading my
own cause but employing another as my advocate. But I take greater
satisfaction in a victory in which I defeat you, not only in the suit, but also
in this argument of yours. So let me tell you in turn, wisest of masters, that
in either event I shall not have to pay what you demand, whether judgment
be pronounced for or against me. For if the jurors decide in my favour,
according to their verdict nothing will be due you, because I have won; but
if they give judgment against me, by the terms of our contract I shall owe
you nothing, because I have not won a case”.
Gellius concludes the story by noting that the court was struck by the
intricacy of the arguments and refused to give a ruling:40
"… the jurors, thinking that the plea on both sides was uncertain and
insoluble, for fear that their decision, for whichever side it was rendered,
might annul itself, left the matter undecided and postponed the case to a
distant day. Thus a celebrated master of oratory was refuted by his
youthful pupil with his own argument, and his cleverly devised sophism
failed".
The story of Protagoras and Euathlus reveals an internal paradox within
the normative structure governing this case, leading – at least according to
Gellius – to a decisional paralysis. To make the paradox more precise let
us disentangle the story into a series of norms and norm-propositions.
39

Gellius, ibid at 407-9.

40

Gellius, ibid at 409.
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In deciding a contractual dispute a Court should give effect to and
enforce the contractual commitments made by the parties.
According to the contract made between Protagoras and Euathlus,
Euathlus will pay the full fee only after he won his first case.
Protagoras brought a suit against Euathlus claiming his fee. This
was Euathlus' first case.
Hence, by (1) Protagoras' suit should be rejected since at the time
the court was required to give a ruling, the contractual condition
had not been fulfilled.
If the court rejects Protagoras' suit (ruling for Euathlus), it will, by
this very act, fulfill the contractual condition, thus completing
Protagoras' cause of action.41
Hence, by (1) Protagoras' suit should be accepted.
If the court accepts Protagoras' suit, Euathlus will in fact lose; by
its ruling the Court will cause the contractual condition not be
fulfilled.
Hence, by (1) Protagoras' suit should be rejected.

Statements (3) and (5) and (7) are clearly contradictory. Attempting to
reason about the correct legal answer leads to a seemingly insoluble
oscillation, in which a ruling for Euathlus, leads to a ruling for Protagoras,
leading to a ruling for Euathlus ad infinitum.42 The paradox is generated
by the fact that – due to the contract's peculiar structure – the correct legal
answer (which should be reflected in the ruling) depends in an unsettling
way on the court's ultimate ruling.43 This pathological oscillation is similar
to the semantic instability generated by the liar paradox; in the legal
context it may lead to judicial paralysis, as indeed was reported by Gellius.
However, in law paralysis is not an acceptable option. Legal decisions
41

This proposition builds on the fact that the ruling operates as a performative speech-act.
Such speech-acts have the capacity of making themselves true or binding by being
pronounced in adequate circumstances. See, Lennart Aqvist, Some Remarks on
Performatives in the Law 11 Artificial Intelligence and the Law 105, 106, 110 (2003).

42

See also on this point, Sobel, supra note 35, at 10.

43

See Sobel, ibid.
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unlike decisions in science, math or philosophy cannot be deferred to a
later date.44 That decisions must be made is, in itself, a basic norm of any
legal system.
Indeed, the praxis of law seems to adhere to this basic precept showing
little signs of paradoxical stoppages. This may signal that the role
paradoxes are playing in law is not really pathological. But let us return to
the story of Protagoras and Euathlus. Despite its seemingly insolubility
there are several ways in which this paradox may be resolved. They are
based on two primary techniques: introducing a distinction
(reinterpretation) or appealing to external principles.
Consider, first, the option of reinterpretation. The court has several ways
to reinterpret the foregoing problematic normative cluster. The first option
disentangles the temporal components of the paradox. In determining the
status of the parties' rights and obligations the court does not need to take a
forward looking approach; that is, it does not have to consider the
consequences of its ruling on the parties contractual obligations. Rather it
needs only to assess their rights as they are at the moment of its decision.
According to this interpretation (3) represents the correct decision,
implying that Protagoras suit was premature, and (5) and (7) are simply
incorrect. This interpretation lays the foundation, though, for a future suit
by Protagoras.45 Another approach seeks to resolve the paradox by
focusing on its self-referential aspect. Thus the phrase ‘first case’ may be
interpreted as not applicable to a case involving Protagoras and Euathlus
as parties, thus barring the problematic self reference that is generated by
the contract. This requires us to reformulate (2) again resolving the
paradox (leading to a ruling against Protagoras).
44

This is not always recognized by philosophers. Thus, Jordan Howard Sobel notes for
example that "rather than reach a final disposition in the case a court might be moved to
suspend the case, to put off or postpone judgement to a later day. This action could
recommend itself as a desperate expedient to avoid self-contradiction: deferral could
recommend itself to a court that considered, whether correctly or incorrectly, that it had
no other way out of a logical trap"; Sobel, ibid, at 4.

45

This solution was pointed to by Leibniz who discussed this paradox in one of his
papers. See Sobel, supra note 35, at 7-9. See also Peter Suber, The Paradox of SelfAmendment: A Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change (1990) available online
at http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/ , section 20(A).
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While the foregoing solutions are not uniquely legal the appeal to external
principles reflects an a-logical approach, because it does not seek to
resolve the paradox through the introduction of further distinctions but
rather dissolves it through an appeal to hierarchically superior normative
principles. Thus, the court may invoke the 'good-faith' principle, and
conclude that Protagoras’ scheme was dishonest. Alternatively, the
contract could be revised in equity. Euathlus could be ordered to pay
earnest money while making a reasonable effort to take on another case or
to pay reasonable sum for the time Protagoras had already devoted to his
instruction.46

B. PARADOXES IN THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER: THE CASES OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ('WTO') AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ('ICC')
This section explores the deep inconsistency that is associated with the
Westphalian scheme of validity as it is invoked in two key treaty-regimes:
the WTO and the ICC. This deep inconsistency is generated, as we shall
see, by the fact that both regimes cling to the traditional Westphalian
scheme, while simultaneously introducing conflicting validation and law
making techniques.

1. THE CASE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ('WTO')
“the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization
dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to
ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible”47.

46

47

See further, Suber, ibid.

See,
‘The
WTO...
In
brief‘,
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm, visited 11 March 2007.
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At first glance the WTO looks like a classic product of the Westphalian
order. The WTO regime is the product of a complex web of treaties which
were signed in 1994 after a long negotiation process (the Uruguay Round
(1986-1994)).48 The constitutional core of this web consists of two
agreements the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
('the WTO Agreement'), which is the umbrella instrument, and the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes ('the DSU'), which establishes the WTO legal system.49
The WTO Agreement and the DSU include various provisions which
allude to the Westphalian notion of validation, with its emphasis on state
consent and the associated ideal of national sovereignty. Thus, for
example, Article XIV of the WTO Agreement, which deals with
'Acceptance, Entry into Force and Deposit' and Article XII, which deals
with 'Accession', provide that accepting the authority of the WTO requires
a formal act from the joining state. The WTO does not claim to have
universal jurisdiction. In the same spirit Article XV, which deals with the
issue of 'Withdrawal' states that "Any Member may withdraw from this
Agreement". Finally, the DSU, which governs the settlement of disputes,
includes a provision which seeks to protect the rights of the Member
States, and to preclude the possibility that these rights will be altered by
the WTO judicial bodies. Article 3(2) of the DSU states that (my
emphasis):
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.
The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and

48

World Trade Organization,
edition).
49

Understanding the WTO (2003, 3

rd

The DSU is annexed to the WTO Agreement (Annex 2, Article III(3)) and thus derives
its validity from the former agreement.

20

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.
The Westphalian vision, reflected in the provisions quoted above,
postulates the WTO as a highly controllable entity that is completely
dependent on the states that have established it. Article 3(2) of the DSU
gives the WTO judicial bodies a very limited role: they are expected
merely to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements and to clarify their meaning. Article 3(2) thus portrays
the WTO as a static normative space, whose contours were totally
determined by the Member states.
This portrait of the WTO system fails to appreciate, however, the highly
autonomous character of the WTO legal system.50 It disregards the powers
of the WTO new legal system, which - contra to the above portrait – has
been actively shaping the normative field of the WTO – independently of
the wishes and preferences of the Member states. This autonomy is
formally codified in articles 23, 16:4 and 17:14 of the DSU, which jointly
transform the WTO dispute settlement mechanism into an obligatory
system, insulated from political intervention. In various rulings since 1995
the WTO judicial bodies have created new rights and obligations, which
have not existed as such before these decisions, and depart substantively
from the legal tradition of the GATT.51
50

This tension is highlighted also by Sol Picciotto: "The WTO’s dispute settlement
procedures involved a significant shift toward a more legalistic model of adjudication
than in the GATT… Nevertheless, the legitimacy of WTO rules is still defended on the
grounds that they have been agreed by governments". Sol Picciotto, The WTO's Appellate
Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 18 Governance 477,
495 (2005).

51

On the norm-making powers of the WTO tribunals see Andrew Guzman, Global
Governance and the WTO, 45 Harvard International Law Journal 303, 347 (2002),
Picciotto, ibid and Oren Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism:
Rethinking the Trade and Environment Conflict (2004), chapter 3. Two prominent
examples of law making by the WTO judicial bodies are the Appellate Body decision that
both it and the panels have a wide discretion to accept amicus curiae briefs from non-state
parties and its novel interpretation to Article XX. For a discussion of these issues see Perez,
ibid, at 65-80, 100-105. See also paras 79-91 and 99-110 to United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 Oct 1998
(Appellate Body Report) and paras 50-57 to European Communities - Measures Affecting
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2. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
"The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, permanent court
that tries persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern,
namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes".52

A similar tension also exists in the new regime of the International
Criminal Court ('ICC'). The ICC was created after long and protracted
negotiations, which culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute on 17
July 1998.53 The Statute provides that the ICC will have jurisdiction over
crimes of genocide, certain crimes against humanity, and certain war
crimes. On first reading the ICC seems like another prototype of the
Westphalian model - a treaty produced through inter-state bargaining. This
conclusion is supported by Article 126(1) of the Rome Statute which
stipulates that the Statute shall enter into force after the deposit of the 60th
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. This provision refers to the
principle of 'pacta sunt servanda' as the treaty source of validity. The
Westphalian order also underlies Article 4(2) which deals with the legal
status and powers of the Court and provides that “The Court may exercise
its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any
State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other
State”.54

the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135, 18 September
2000 (Appellate Body Report) ('EC-Asbestos') (on the amicus briefs question) and the
Shrimp decision, paras. 153-159 in particular, on the interpretation of article XX.
52

See: About the Court, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html, visited 11 March 2007.

53

By the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court.

54

My emphasis.
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However, on closer inspection the ICC treaty seems to include provisions
which visibly challenge the Westphalian validity scheme.55 This is
reflected in the Statute’s claim to hold jurisdiction over citizens of nonparties,56 in the establishment of new universal criminal norms which
transcend customary international law as it existed prior to the
establishment of the Rome Treaty,57 in the formal legal recognition of
non-state actors (victims and NGOs),58 and finally in the decision-making
powers which are given to the Court.59
It is worthwhile to explore more closely the nearly universal jurisdiction
which is given to the Court in Article 12. Article 12 provides the Court
with a jurisdiction over persons who are not citizens of one of the
signatories to the ICC. According to Article 12 the ICC has jurisdiction to
prosecute a national of any state when crimes within the court's subjectmatter jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a state that is a party

55

For a more detailed discussion of the tension between the ICC regime and the
Westpahlian validity scheme see Jackson N. Maogoto, The Final Balance Sheet? The
International Criminal Court’s Challenges and Concessions to the Westphalian Model,
ExpressO Preprint Series. Working Paper 1402 4, 14 (2006), Leila Nadya Sadat and
Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 Geo.
L.J 381, 385, 390-391 (2000) and Morris, supra note 8, at 30-33.

56

Article 12.

57

Articles 5-8.

58

Through Article 15 which provides that the prosecutor may initiate investigations on
the basis of information received from non-governmental organizations, Maogoto supra
note 55, at 7.

59

See, in particular Article 19(1) ("The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in
any case brought before it"), Article 21 (providing the court with the power to derive new
international legal principles from "national laws of legal systems of the world" and
Article 119(1) (endowing the Court with the authority to settle disputes "concerning the
judicial functions". See further Morris, supra note 8, at 30-33.
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to the treaty or that consents to ICC jurisdiction for that case.60 The court
is thus empowered to exercise jurisdiction even in cases in which the
defendant's state of nationality is not a party to the treaty and does not
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.61 The jurisdictional principle
underlying article 12 stands in stark contrast to the constitutional principle
of 'state consent'. This deviation is particularly striking when the ICC
treaty is compared to the ICJ Statute and the ICJ jurisdictional
jurisprudence.62
Some proponents of the ICC Treaty have tried to explain this internal
inconsistency within the ICC treaty by arguing that the Court's jurisdiction
over the nationals of non-party states is based, in effect, on existing
principles of customary international law. According to this view the ICC
jurisdiction is based "upon the principles of universal jurisdiction pursuant
to which the courts of any state may prosecute the nationals of any state
for certain serious international crimes. Since any individual state could
prosecute perpetrators regardless of their nationality, they reason, a group
of states may create an international court empowered to do the same".63
In a recent article Madeline Morris demonstrated convincingly that this
thesis has no basis in contemporary customary international law. First, the
delegated universal jurisdiction theory does not account for a number of
crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC that are not subject
to universal jurisdiction. Second, the intricate institutional structure which
was established by the Rome Treaty, with the unique enforcement and
interpretative powers it provides to the Court and the Prosecutor, creates a
60

This is in addition to jurisdiction based on Security Council action under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter and jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant's state of
nationality.

61. See on this point: Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over
Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2000) and Morris,
supra note 8, at 13-14.
62

See Morris, ibid, at 20-21.

63

See Morris, ibid, at 27-28. See also Jordan J. Paust, supra note 61 at 3.

24

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

legal environment which is radically different from the one envisioned by
the decentralized model that existed prior to the establishment of the ICC.
Thus consent to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by individual states
is not equivalent to consent to universal jurisdiction delegated to an
international court.64

IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF NORMATIVE
GROUNDING
The Westphalian doctrine of validity, with its emphasis on consensual
norm creation through state negotiation, does not seem to cohere with
contemporary legal practices. The normative deficit that was created by
the demise of the Westphalian scheme is being populated by alternative
forms of validation. Four legal ideas emerge as particularly noteworthy in
this respect and I will discuss each of them briefly: global democracy,
deference to non-legal rationalities, direct individual consent and the new
association between law and technology. These alternative schemes
challenge the classic conceptions of international law, generating a new
and deeply complex legal universe.65 However, as we consider each of
these alternative schemes more closely it becomes obvious that the project
of providing solid foundations to the international legal system fails not
just because of the deep differences between these varied normative
schemes, but also because when considered separately they yield
inconsistencies that are as problematic as the ones generated by the
conventional Westphalian doctrine. These horizontal and intrinsic
paradoxes cast doubt upon the claim that these alternative doctrines
provide a new, universal model of validity.
64

Some authors have tried to explain the UCC jurisdiction by appealing to universal
moral principles. I will return to that issue below, section IV(b).

65

This complexity cannot be captured by uni-dimensional concepts such as the
"proliferation of international judicial bodies", Guillaume, supra note 1. For a discussion
of this complexity in the context of UNCITRAL see Maria Panezi and Peer Zumbansen,
'The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)',
forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008).
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A. GLOBAL DEMOCRACY?
Global democracy is invoked increasingly⎯in both theory and
practice⎯as a new form of validation which imagines the democratic
principle as a truly global idea, thus undercutting the role of the state.
Unlike the idea of global democracy the Westphalian doctrine has limited
aspirations regarding the regulation of the political process.66 The consent
requirement underlying the Westphalian doctrine was interpreted as a
purely formalistic condition of constitutional adequacy,67 which does not
set substantive conditions to national political structures. Some authors
have tried to offer a more democratic interpretation of the Westphalian
narrative by arguing that the principle of consent should be read as a
requirement to subject the transnational diplomatic process to a
meaningful domestic political scrutiny. This interpretation seeks to portray
the act of consent as a product of meaningful political deliberation.68
However, under the Westphalian scheme the state retains the authority to
structure the domestic political process. Further, the political model that
emerges from this interpretation is highly fragmented – unlike the unified
vision underlying the model of global democracy.

66

Thus, the only hint in the Vienna Convention to the possible tension between the
formal consent of the state and the will of the people is indirect. Article 46 provides that:
“(1) A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a
rule of its internal law of fundamental importance; (2) A violation is manifest if it would
be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with
normal practice and in good faith.” (my emphasis).

67

.Id. art. 7.

68

.See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law:
Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 189, 231 (1999).
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However the model global democracy is deeply problematic in terms of its
underlying principles and possible applications. In terms of its theoretical
underpinnings the vision of global democratization is torn between several
potentially conflicting commitments. The proponents of global
democratization invoke several core commitments. First a commitment to
inclusiveness and open decision-making structures. Second, a commitment
to decision-making based on open and rational deliberation, geared toward
consensual agreement. Third, a commitment to individual freedom and
fundamental human rights. Fourth, a commitment to the value of cultural
pluralism. And finally, a commitment to embed these core commitments
in global governance institutions.69
These commitments conflict in various ways. First, the establishment of
strong global institutions - replacing the fragmented and relatively weak
bodies that characterize the contemporary international order - is in
tension with the commitment to individual freedom and cultural pluralism.
As the distance between the global political center and the citizen-body
grows, so does the risk that the voice of the citizen and the local
community will be ignored. A strong central establishment constitutes,
therefore, a risk to individual freedom and cultural pluralism. Second, it is
not clear whether the commitment to open deliberation and consensual
decision-making can be realized given the vast cultural and ideological
differences that characterize the contemporary global society. It is not
clear what kind of criteria could guide this deliberative effort, given that
choosing any particular criterion could jeopardize the commitment to
pluralism. The political institutions of majority voting and parliamentary
representation offer a way to circumvent this normative deficit, but do not
resolve it.

69

See, David Held, Cosmopolitanism: globalization tamed? 29 Review of International
Studies 465 (2003) and Michael Walzer International Society: What is the Best that We
Can Do? Occasional Papers, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study ,June
2000, Paper Number 8.
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These dilemmas have been apparent in the few attempts to implement the
vision of global democracy in practice. Thus, for example, in 2000, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") made
an ambitious attempt to develop a governance structure based on
electronically-mediated model of representative democracy. ICANN tried
to use the Internet to create legitimacy, first by opening its decisionmaking process to the public (transparency), and second by conducting
global, internet-based elections for its central governing body (the 'At
Large Membership Program'). This attempt has failed however (leading
ICANN to abandon its democratic aspirations), and was heavily criticized
in terms of its failure to achieve true global representation and
responsiveness to civic concerns.70 Other institutions – such as the Global
Reporting Initiative ("GRI") – have established multi-stakeholder
consultation processes, reflecting a commitment to consensual decisionmaking.71 But despite the relative success of the GRI, it remained confined
to a limited filed - sustainability reporting – making no claim for global
applicability. The tensions which underlie the theoretical articulations of
the idea of global democracy were not resolved by the few practical
attempts to design global democratic institutions. The idea of global
democratization remains a deeply contested notion, both in theory and in
practice.

70

ICANN's experiment failed in the sense that ICANN has radically changed its
governance structure, adopting a much milder concept of democracy. Nonetheless
ICANN's experiment still constitutes an important mile stone in the attempts to transform
the abstract idea of global democratization into a practical model. For a detailed
discussion and critiuqe of ICANN's democratic experiment see, John G. Palfrey, The End
of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray Into Global Internet Democracy Failed, 17
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 410, 412 (2004).

71

Details about the GRI can be found at http://www.globalreporting.org. The World
Wide Web Consortium provides another example of an attempt to design global
standards through multi-stakeholder consultation (see http://www.w3.org/ respectively).
The rule-making process at the International Organization for Standardization is a good
example of a consensual structure among closed communities; see: Oren Perez, Global
Legal Pluralism and Electronic Democracy, In R. Gibson, A. Roemmele and S. Ward
(eds.), Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, Organisation and Participation via New
ICTs, (2004), pp. 133, 143.
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B. DEFERENCE TO NON-LEGAL RATIONALITY
The attempt to look for grounding in external, non-legal rationalities has
been most visible in the field of human rights. The appeal to universal
moral principles as a ground for new global legal norms is particularly
noteworthy in two contexts: the problematic jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court and the question of humanitarian
intervention. Thus, some authors have tried to justify the novel ICC
jurisdiction by what amounts, in effect, to a direct appeal to moral
principles. The ICC treaty belongs, it was argued to a new genre of treaties
that are "globally binding because they foster the common interests of
humanity".72 In the context of humanitarian intervention authors have
argued for the emergence of a new grund norm: a principle of "civilian
inviolability".73
But the appeal to this new source of validity seems problematic not only
because the choice of the pivotal norm seems somewhat arbitrary, but also
because the meaning of the proposed norms remains deeply fuzzy. As
Madeline Morris argued in a recent article (her argument is directed
against the first thesis, but its logic is equally applicable to the second): "A
threshold problem with the theory of global treaties is that there will
72

73

Morris, supra note 8, at 52.

See Anne-Marie Slaughter and William W. Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2002). Other authors have proposed a
different principle 'a responsibility to protect' See, e.g., Gareth Evans and Mohamed
Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 81 Foreign Affairs 99 (2002); Bruce, W.
Jentleson, A Responsibility to Protect 28 Harvard International Review 18 (2007). See
also Held, supra note 69 (arguing for a new global order based on two meta-moral
principles: the metaprinciple of autonomy and the metaprinciple of impartialist reasoning,
ibid, at 471, 472). For a critique of Slaughter and Burke-White view (which is applicable
to the other proposals), see Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining Sovereignty via
International Constitutional Moments? In Redefining Sovereignty: The Use of Force after
the End of the Cold War. New Options, Lawful and Legitimate?, edited by M. E.
O’Connell, M. Bothe and N. Ronzitti (2005) and Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty?
Empire Versus International Law 18 Ethics and International Affairs 1 (2004).
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inevitably be disagreement about what in fact will serve the common
interests of humanity. An equally formidable problem confronting the
theory of global treaties is that, even if that which would serve the
common interests of humanity could be dispositively identified, that alone
would not bind states who would find unacceptable a particular
distribution of the burdens involved in serving those interests".74 The deep
vagueness of these new postulated norms calls for further interpretation,
and sets the ground for interpretative disputes.75 It is not clear what criteria
will govern such disputes and which authority will decide them. The
suggested new grund norms do not resolve such questions.
Similar appeals to non-legal rationalities can be found in other domains.
Thus in the environmental domain we can find reference to new
environmental ethics epitomized in the concepts of sustainable
development76 and the precautionary principle.77 Environmental ethics
provides an additional and independent mode of justification, operating
alongside other forms of groundings.78 Science has also been used
74

Morris, supra note 8, at 52.

75

Similar problems affflict the question of humanitarian intervention, see, e.g., the debate
in the special issue INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY, Vol. 7(1) Spring 2001,
http://law.ubalt.edu/cicl/ilt/ILT_VII_1.pdf.

76

On the principle of sustainable development see, Benjamin J. Richardson and Stepan
Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability (2006) especially chapter 1 (13-17)
and chapter 11 (373-75).

77

On the precautionary principle see, Richardson and Wood (eds), ibid, chapter 11 (36164).

78

Thus two prominent examples are the WTO Agreement, which includes in its preamble
a reference to the principle of Sustainable Development, and the Global Reporting
Initiative 2006 Sustainability Guidelines, which open with a reference to the principle of
Sustainable Development. The WTO tribunals have relied on the invocation of the
principle of sustainability in justifying their new (pro-environment) interpretation of
article XX; see: United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, supra note 51, at paras. 153 and 155. For a discussion of the WTO trade and
environment jurisprudence see Perez, supra note 51, chapter 3.
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increasingly as mode of grounding, especially and in the trade and
environment domains.79 In both of these domains, the problems of
choosing between the competing external sources and the indeterminacy
of the external principles remain unresolved.80 We are confronted, again,
not just by conflicting interpretations of the same a-legal rationality (e.g.,
environmental ethics), but also by deep uncertainty as to how these
distinct rationalities relate to each other. There seem to be no agreement
with respect to how these competing forms of rationality could be ranked
and their domains of applicability defined. Indeed, there is no unified
moral theory that could bring these different world views under a single
umbrella in a way that would be globally accepted (successfully bridging
between the cultural-moral disagreements that characterize the
contemporary global society).

C. INDIVIDUAL CONSENT
The doctrine of individual consent forms a third pattern of validation. The
idea of individual consent draws both on universal principles of contract
law and on the ethos of liberal individualism, with its strong emphasis on
79

A good example is the deference to science in the the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ('SPS Agreement') definition of risk
assessment (with science rather than law provides the criteria for proper risk assessment),
see Articles 2, 5 and Annex A(4). For a discussion, see Perez, ibid, chapter 4. The
Climate Change Convention, provides another example, through its reliance on the work
and judgement of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ('IPCC'). See,
http://www.ipcc.ch/.

80

E.g., Oren Perez, The Institutionalization of Inconsistency: from Fluid Concepts to
Random Walk. In Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in Law, edited by O. Perez and G.
Teubner (2006) 148-156 and Oren Perez Anomalies at the Precautionary Kingdom:
Reflections on the GMO Panel's Decision 6 World Trade Review (Summer 2007) 1-16
(with respect to the vagueness of the precautionary principle), and David G. Victor,
Recovering Sustainable Development, 85 Foreign Affairs 91, 92 (2006) with respect to
the vagueness of the sustainability paradigm (noting that "UN summits that have yielded
broad and incoherent documents and policies. Sustainable development, the compass that
was designed to show the way to just and viable economics, now swings in all
directions").
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freedom of choice and self-determination.81 This form of validation claims
to free international law from its traditional reliance on the state as a
necessary perquisite for the making of global norms. The concept of
individual consent plays a particularly central role in two fields of
international law: international arbitration and internet law. Yet, as with
the other techniques this concept yields deep and unresolved puzzles.
Consider, first, the arbitration field. An increasing number of international
disputes are being adjudicated today in global arbitration centers. This
trend can be attributed both to the legal regime which was created by the
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards and to a general expansion in the number of
international business transactions.82 The New York Convention ensures
worldwide exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration proceedings based on valid
arbitration agreements, provides procedures for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards, and limits the grounds on which domestic
courts can refuse requests for enforcement to a few basic procedural
defects. The New York Convention is therefore not just a mechanism of
enforcement; through the principle of non-interference it has facilitated the
emergence of a new global law, which is insulated from the influence of
inter-state politics.83 The normative space that was created by the New
York Convention has been filled by a new a-national system of
81

See B. Schwartz, Self-determination. The Tyranny of Freedom, 55 American
Psychologist 79 (2000) and Wendy Larner, Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology,
Governmentality, 63 Studies in Political Economy 5 (2000).

82

See Pedro Martinez-Fraga, The Convergence of Legal Cultures in Arbitration and
Amendments to the New York Convention: If it is Not Broken, Why Fix it, but if it is
Good, Make it Better, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 6 No. 20
(October 2006) at 12 . Similar increase has taken place at the field of investment
arbitration, see Luke Eric Peterson, The Global Governance of Foreign Direct
Investment: Madly Off in All Directions, Occasional Papers, Dialogue Globalization, N°
19 (May 2005) at 12-14.
83

As of 12 March 2007 the Convention had 142 parties. An updated data about the status
of
the
Convention
can
be
found
at
UNCITRAL
web-site
at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html
(visited 12 March 2007).
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international commercial law, the new lex mercatoria,84 and a new
institutional apparatus, comprised of independent arbitrators and several
permanent arbitral centers such as the International Chamber of
Commerce International Court of Arbitration ('ICC Court'), the London
Court of International Arbitration ('LCIA') and the US International Centre
for Dispute Resolution.85 But trying to unfold the normative status of this
new nexus of norms and institutions reveals a deep puzzle. How can a
system that is based on disaggregated and discontinuous contractual
arrangements (arbitration clauses),86 claim, simultaneously, for a
continuous and permanent legal presence?
The ICC Court constitutes a particularly fascinating example of this
existential paradox. The ICC Court Dispute Resolution Rules87 draw their
validity from the parties' consent.88 What is interesting with respect to the
ICC Court is that in contrast to conventional arbitration, the ICC rules
84

See, for the new lex mercatoria, Alec Stone Sweet, The new Lex Mercatoria and
Transnational Governance, 13 Journal of European Public Policy 627 (2006) and Peer
Zumbansen, Peer, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in
Domestic and International Law, 15 European Journal of International Law 197 (2004).

85

See, respectively http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration, http://www.lciaarbitration.com/ and http://www.adr.org. For other International Arbitration Centers see:
http://www.constructionweblinks.com/Organizations/International__Organizations/arbitr
ation_centers.html#america (visited 20 March 2007).

86

The reliance on arbitration clauses is reflected both in the language of the New York
Convention, which limits its jurisdiction to valid arbitral agreements (Article II(3), and in
the websites of the arbitral centres mentioned above which provide their prospective
clients with recommended arbitration clauses (see the websites of the ICC Court and
LCIA, ibid.). A typical arbitration clause (from the ICC): "All disputes arising out of or in
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in
accordance
with
the
said
Rules."
See,
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4114/index.html, visited on 28 February 2007.

87

See: http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4199/index.html.

88

See Article 6 to the Rules.
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provide the Court with the authority to scrutinize an award.89 Under the
ICC Rules the Arbitral Tribunal is required to submit its award in draft
form to the Court. According to Article 27:90
"Before signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in draft
form to the Court. The Court may lay down modifications as to the form
of the Award and, without affecting the Arbitral Tribunal’s liberty of
decision, may also draw its attention to points of substance. No Award
shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been approved by the
Court as to its form".
Commentators note that in scrutinizing the award the Court focuses on
issues such as the completeness of the award, its adherence to the ICC
Rules and the governing national law, internal consistency, and whether it
is sufficiently reasoned, before authorizing its issuance to the parties.91
Although the Court cannot compel the arbitrators to take account of its
comments with respect to substance, arbitrators usually take notice of the
Court's comments, at least to some extent.92 The Court does not provide
the parties with the reasons for its decision. It seems, then, that by giving
their consent to ICC arbitration parties give their agreement not only to
adjudicate before an arbitrator according to the law of their choosing, but
also to the elusive and autonomous jurisprudence of the ICC Court.93 Thus
89

The Court's role is defined in Article 1 of the Rules, and in Appendixes I and II thereof.
According to Article 1(2) "The Court does not itself settle disputes. It has the function of
ensuring the application of these Rules. It draws up its own Internal Rules (Appendix II)".

90

According to Appendix II, Article 6 "When the Court scrutinizes draft Awards in
accordance with Article 27 of the Rules, it considers, to the extent practicable, the
requirements of mandatory law at the place of arbitration".

91

Ellis Baker and Anthony Lavers, Review of Arbitrators’ Exercise of Power in English
Law: The House of Lords Decides, 22 The International Construction Law 493 (2005).

92

93

Ibid.

The London Court of International Arbitration has a somewhat similar dual
architecture; however the powers of the Court are more limited. See, the LCIR Rules of 1
January 1998 at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/ (in particular articles 3 and 29).
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the ICC Court's powers and the normative force of its jurisprudence rest,
miraculously, on the disaggregated and prospective contractual
arrangements of its current and future 'clients'.
Internet law provides another example of the invocation of individual
consent as an independent grounding. Two prominent examples are
ICANN's regime for the governance of disputes regarding domain
names,94 and the World Wide Web Consortium Platform for Privacy
Preferences Project ('P3P).95 Similarly to the world of arbitration the force
of ICANN's dispute resolution policy and the P3P code stems from the
direct consent of the concerned individuals – without the mediation of the
state. In the case of ICANN's dispute settlement policy the consent is
given in the contract signed between a domain-name holder and a
registrar. In the case of P3P, the platform is incorporated into the
architecture of the browsers and the websites, and consent is implied from
the purchase or usage of the browser and its actual usage.96 The global

94

See,
ICANN
Uniform
Domain-Name
Dispute
Resolution
Policy
(http://www.icann.org/udrp/). The Policy is applicable across all gTLDs (.aero, .biz, .cat,
.com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, .name, .net, .org, .pro, .tel and .travel). The
policy provides for obligatory international arbitration for disputes arising from alleged
abusive registrations of domain names (for example, cybersquatting). The arbitration
proceedings may be initiated by a holder of trademark rights. The UDRP is a policy
between a registrar and its customer and is included in registration agreements for all
ICANN-accredited registrars. A list of approved dispute-resolution service providers is
available at: http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (visited 20 March
2007).

95

Available at http://www.w3.org/P3P/. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project
enables Websites to express their privacy practices in a standard format that can be
retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user agents. P3P user agents will allow
users to be informed of site practices (in both machine- and human-readable formats) and
to automate decision-making based on these practices when appropriate. Thus users need
not read the privacy policies at every site they visit. Ibid.
96

In some cases the browser is already installed in the computer when it is purchased;
consent is then indicated through the total act of purchase.

2007]

PURITY LOST

35

code is reinterpreted in these cases as a contract – a true manifestation of
the idea of social contract.97
This new form of validity finds resonance in the ideas of individual
integrity and individual empowerment, which are central to contemporary
Western culture. On close scrutiny, however, postulating individual
consent as a validating force seems highly problematic. In the case of
arbitration the gap between the disaggregated and discontinuous
contractual consent and the permanent nature of the lex mercatoria and
some of the new arbitral centers seems unbridgeable. In the case of the
new internet codes, the invocation of consent does not seem to cohere with
the traditional understanding of consent in contract law - the image of
"two autonomous wills coming together to express their autonomy by
binding themselves reciprocally to a bargain of exchange".98 Can one
seriously speak about consent in the context of ICANN's policy and the
P3P code, if the individual in question has not taken part in the negotiation
of the code/contract in question, and in effect has no choice but to accept it
if he wants to register a domain name or enjoy some kind of privacy
protection as he surfs the net (recall that P3P is encoded in the architecture
of both websites and browsers).
If one rejects individual consent as an acceptable form of validation,
perhaps there is no choice but to look for alternative groundings. Thus, in
97

For the idea of social contract, see: S. A. Lloyd, Hobbes's Moral and Political
Philosophy, In E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002) and
Williamson M. Evers, Social Contract: A Critique 1 Journal of Libertarian Studies 185
(1977).

98

Margaret Jane Radin, BOILERPLATE TODAY: THE RISE OF MODULARITY AND
THE WANING OF CONSENT 104 Michigan Law Review 1223, 1231 (2006), See further
on the problematic of contract formation in standard electronic contracts and question of
privacy protection Radin, ibid, Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in electronic contracting:
minimum standards for non-negotiated contracts 42 Hous. L. Rev. 1041, 1045 (2005)
and Lisa M. Austin, Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada's
Experience Under PIPEDA 56 University of Toronto Law Journal 181, 191 (2006). And
who says consent is a globally valid principle of contract formation? The idea of
individual consent is also central to international arbitration and the New York
Convention.
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the case of the lex mercatoria, can one appeal to universal principles of
commercial law⎯a natural law of contracts? And in the case of ICANN’s
UDDRP and the P3P standard, validity may reside not in the fictitious
consent but in the process through which they were developed⎯their
invocation of notions such as democracy and procedural justice?
The increasingly blurred normative reality that characterizes the
contemporary international legal universe provides wide occasions for
horizontal conflicts between different forms of validation. The field of
investment disputes provides a particularly interesting example for this
potential tension. There is a problematic interplay between forum selection
clauses that are included in individual investment contracts and arbitration
procedures set out in bilateral investment treaties ('BIT') (interpreted in
light of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other State).99 The question raised in
these conflicts is whether the forum selection clause can be seen as a
waiver of BIT jurisdiction. In other words, the question is whether the
norm of the contract trumps the norm of the treaty or vice versa. There is a
diversity of opinions on this question.100

D. THE BUNDLING OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

99

For the text of ICSID treaty and details about the way in which it operates see:
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid. As at April 10, 2006, 143 countries have ratified the
Convention (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/intro.htm, visited on 6 March
2007).
100

See the discussion in the ICSID cases: Aguas del Tunari et al v. Bolivia, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/3 at pp. 21-30; SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/02/6,
paras.
136-155
(both
available
from
http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html, visited 6 March 2007) and Gerold Zeiler,
Treaty v Contract : What is the Best Venue for Investment Disputes? Austrian Arbitration
Yearbook 323, 332-348 (2007) and Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective
Compliance—Cost-Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration 7 Journal of World
Investment & Trade 653, 676-679 (2006).
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Another highly novel source of global validity is the bundling of law and
technology. This new technique emerged as a side effect of the
development of digital technology that allows the bundling of software
and norms in one digitized product.101 Such norm-in-the-machine products
have been available in various forms for some time. One example is the
domain of intellectual property rights (“IPR”). Instead of protecting IPR in
a certain product (e.g., software or music) through the use of contractual
terms or by relying on state regulation, IPR can be protected from
violations with special software offering world-wide protection using
various technological means.102 Such technology is being used
increasingly in the fight against online file-sharing softwares.103 The
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project ('P3P') provides another example.
The P3P standard is integrated into a software (browser) and into the
structure of web-sites (another type of machine).104 Another examples are
new filtering softwares that are used to protect minors from exposure to
sexually explicit materials on the web. In this case, as in the case of
101

Machines are understood as devices for accomplishing a task as a collection of
functional components. See Margaret Jane Radin, ONLINE STANDARDIZATION
AND THE INTEGRATION OF TEXT AND MACHINE, 70 Fordham Law Review
1125, 1143 (2002).
102

A good example is MediaMax. MediaMax is a copy-prevention software produced by
SunnComm Technologies that is designed to prevent unauthorized copying of audio CDs
using personal computers. See http://www.mediamaxtechnology.com/ and J. Alex
Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System, Princeton
University Computer Science Technical Report TR-679-03 (2003).
103

The new technological weapon in this case is based on a content-recognition software,
which makes it possible to identify copyrighted material and to block it (- unless it was
licensed for use on the site). One of the key players in this field is Audible Magic (see,
http://www.audiblemagic.com/ , visited 23 March 2007). See, Brad Stone and Miguel
Helft, New Weapon In Web War Over Piracy, New York Times, 19 February 2007.
104

On the structure of P3P technology see, further: Daniel J. Weitzner, Jim Hendler, Tim
Berners-Lee, and Dan Connolly, Creating a Policy-Aware Web: Discretionary, Rulebased Access for the World Wide Web. In Web and Information Security, edited by E.
Ferrari and B. Thuraisingham. Hershey, PA Idea Group Inc (2006) at 5 (reference is to
the posted paper available at: http://www.w3.org/2004/09/Policy-Aware-Web-acl.pdf).
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intellectual property rights, the new software proclaims to fulfill a task that
was previously preserved to state regulation. What is common to all these
cases is the invocation of technology as a new type of (global) Grund
Norm.105
In Ashcroft v. ACLU106 the U.S. Supreme Court has reached a similar
conclusion when it noted that filtering software might more effectively
protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet
than the Child Online Protection Act ('COPA').107 This led the Court to the
conclusion that COPA was unconstitutional (by violating the First
Amendment) because of the availability of less restrictive alternatives.108
The importance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in terms of this
Article's thesis regarding the fragmentation of the idea of validity in the
international domain lies not in the particulars of American free speech
doctrine, but in its de facto recognition of technology as a source of
private law.109
105

For further discussion of this phenomenon see Radin supra note 98, and Margaret Jane
Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ.
1 (2004).

106

Ashcroft v. ACLU, No. 03-218., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
, 540 U.S. 944, available at: http://supreme.justia.com/us/542/656/case.html.
107

47 U. S. C. §231.

108

Filtering software was seen as less restrictive because filters impose selective
restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under
a filtering regime, childless adults may gain access to speech they have a right to see
without having to identify themselves or provide their credit card information. Even
adults with children may obtain access to the same speech on the same terms simply by
turning off the filter on their home computers. Further, promoting filter use does not
condemn as criminal any category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is
eliminated, or at least much diminished. Ibid.

109

One can see a similar process taking place at the field of morality. See, Bruno Latour
and Couze Venn, Morality and Technology: The End of the Means, 19 Theory Culture
Society 247, 253-54 (2002).
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But the claim that technology acts as new form of normative grounding
seems to confuse between the is and the ought - leaping from efficacy to
normativity.110 This problematic has not escaped (legal) observers of
modern technology. Thus, for example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(“EFF”) brought legal action against Sony BMG based on its distribution
of CDs that incorporated an IPR protection software (MediaMax).111 One
of the claims raised by EFF alleged that many consumers were not aware
that the CDs they bought included this software and that it was
downloaded to their computers without their consent.112 Once again, we
see a conflict between two forms of validation: technology and individual
consent.113

110

This leap characterizes the concept of legal validity in general. See: Csaba Varga,
Validity, 41 Acta Juridica Hungarica 155 (2000) and the discussion in the following
section.

111

For other cases dealing with this problematic see: Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422
F.3d 630 (2005), DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA , 31 Cal. 4th 864 (2004).
112

See the complaint filed by EFF (21 November 2005), available at:
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/sony_complaint.pdf (visited 23 March 2007). In
response to the filing of the suit by EFF, SunnComm has taken a commitment to ensure
that future versions of MediaMax will not install when the user declines the end user
license agreement ("EULA") that appears when a CD is first inserted in a computer CD
or DVD drive. SunnComm has also agreed to include uninstallers in all versions of
MediaMax software, to submit all future versions to an independent security-testing firm
for review, and to release to the public the results of the independent security testing. See,
EFF, CD Copy Protection Firm Promises Fix for Software Problems, February 02, 2006,
February
2006
News
Archive,
available
at,
http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2006_02.php#004378 (visited 20 March 2007). For the
full litigation history see: http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/#docs.
113

Radin, supra note 98, at 1231.
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V. TAKING A STEP BACK: HAVE WE EVER BEEN
PURE?
A. PURITY REVISITED
The structure of contemporary international law is clearly incompatible
with the pure Westphalian conception of international law. Deeper
reflection, however, exposes the purity of the Westphalian order as a
fictitious construct, whose claim for coherence and completeness does not
stand up to scrutiny, even if we limit its domain of applicability to the
(distant) past. The impurity of the Westphalian scheme of validity
becomes apparent almost immediately when considered from the
perspective of simple logic. State will cannot be considered the ultimate
source of international law because it leaves unanswered the question of
the normative force of the rule that says that ‘will’ binds. Thus, the force
of the norm “pacts must be respected” must be assumed to derive – if we
want to avoid circularity - from a source that is independent of the will of
states.114 This has already been noted by various scholars of international
law. For example, Hersch Lauterpact, in a book published in 1927,
notes:115
"To say that the binding force of treaties is derived from the will of
contracting parties who, through an act of self-limitation, give up a part of
their sovereignty, is to leave unanswered the query why the treaty
continues to be binding after the will of one party has undergone a change.
The will of the parties can never be the ultimate source of the binding
114

See also Martti Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations : the rise and fall of
international law,
1870-1960 (2001) 364.
115

See, Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law:
With Special Reference to International Arbitration, (1927, 2002) 56-57. See also Hersch
Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1933) 416-420.
Lauterpacht refers to various scholars such as Bluntschli, Bar and Anzilotti.
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force of a contract whose continued validity is necessarily grounded in a
higher objective rule… it is the objective validity, independent of the will
of States, of the rule pacta sunt servanda which renders legally possible the
working of conventional international law".
The attempt to resolve the question of the force of pacta sunt servanda
through appeal to a higher customary law faces similar difficulties. At the
level of customary international law we have to cope with the parallel
question of the source and status of the norms regulating the making of
customary international law. If the idea of customary international law
regulating itself does not seem satisfactory we have no choice but to
imagine a higher level law - an imaginary constitutional global law which will be the source of such norms.116
But the impurity of the Westphalian model does not lie just in its lack of
grounding. It is also reflected in the way in which the idea of state consent
opens up the possibility of a legal universe comprised of parallel, equal
standing, legal regimes that are not subject to any superstructure of higher
level law.117 This is not mere theoretical conjecture: the presidents of the
ICJ have warned on several occasions of the risks posed by fragmentation
and over-lapping jurisdictions, and one of them noted that "the
proliferation of international courts may jeopardize the unity of
international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State relations".118

116

For the dual hierarchy approach see Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary
International Law, 47 American Journal of International Law 662, 665 (1953). For a
critique see, Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 539-40.
117

118

See, Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 549.

See, the speeches of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel and Judge Gilbert Guillaume, supra
note 1, and the speech by Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of
Justice, to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 30 October 2001, http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident_Guillaume_GA56_20011030.ht
m. See further on the issue of fragmentation: Martti Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino
Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 Leiden Journal of
International Law 553 (2001).
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The search for alternative sources of validity is also not new. A prominent
example is the appeal to morality as an independent source of international
law. This modern phenomenon represents, so it seems, a return to the
tradition of natural law dating back to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). The
natural law tradition received a renewed attention in the early 20th century,
appearing in the academic writings of several legal scholars (in a counterreaction to the rise of legal positivism). Thus Hersch Lauterpacht, in his
1927 Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: with
Special Reference to International Arbitration writes about a renaissance
of natural law. He refers to several modern reconstructions of this
tradition, invoking concepts such as "the sense of right" and "social
solidarity". Particularly illuminating is a quote from Frederick Pollock
(1922): "We must either admit that modern international law is a law
founded on cosmopolitan principles of reason, a true living offshoot of the
Law of Nature, or ignore our most authoritative expositions of it".119
Lauterpacht has further developed this thesis in his article The Grotian
Tradition in International Law.120 For Lauterpacht the force of the Grotian
tradition stems from the intrinsic insufficiency of the conception of
international law as derived from state will and from the constant need to
judge its adequacy in the light of ethics and reason.121 It seems, then, that
international law has never been pure. Neither is the search for alternative
groundings a new phenomenon.

119

Lauterpacht (1927, 2002), supra note 115 at 58-59, fn 7.

120

Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1 (1946). Another important figure in the revival of the Grotian tradition was
Cornelius van Vollenhoven, especially in his Three Stages in the Evolution of
International Law (1919). See Renee Jeffery, Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge
and the ‘Grotian Tradition’ in 20th-Century International Relations 6 European Journal
of International Relations 223, 224 (2006).
121

Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 408. Lauterpacht argues in that spirit that "the
acceptance of the law of nature as an independent source of international law" is one of
the precepts of modern international law, Lauterpacht, ibid, at 51. See, further C. Wilfred
Jenks, Hersch Lauterpacht: the Scholar as Prophet, 36 British Yearbook of International
Law 1, 72 (1960) and Jeffery, ibid at 237-241.
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B. THE PROBLEM OF GROUNDING IN LAW AND THE TRUTHTELLER PARADOX
The problem of grounding is a measure of the deep indeterminacy that is
part and parcel of the concept of law in both its municipal and
international realizations. The question of grounding does not afflict just
the Westphalian scheme of consent – it is common to all the forms of
validity which were considered above. . Whenever a new source of
validity is invoked as an alternative to the Westphalian paradigm the
question of its own justification remains lying in the air in a mist of
arbitrary articulations. In considering this problematic it is interesting to
consider a similar puzzle that arises in the filed of semantics – the truthteller paradox. Consider the following sentence:
K1

This sentence is true

We can use the structure of this sentence to produce a truth-telling
sequence (with each sentence belonging to the domain of its
predecessor):122
1
2
3

The next sentence is true
The next sentence is true
The next sentence is true

Initially, one may take these truth-telling sentences as unproblematic.
Indeed, these sentences do not generate the kind of semantic instability
that characterizes liar-like sentences. However, upon reflection, this
conclusion seems hasty. In this case (as with the liar-like statements), the
sentences involved can consistently be assigned conflicting true/false
values. This makes them hopelessly undetermined.123 The distinction
122

This example is taken from Hans Herzberger, Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics
67 The Journal of Philosophy 145, 150 (1970). See also Roy Sorensen, Future Law:
Prepunishment and the Causal Theory of Verdicts, 40 Nous 166, 176 (2006).
123

Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge, Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology,
and the Open Pair 84 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 395, 397 (2006).
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between the Liar Paradox and the Truth-Teller paradox is thus that in the
former the problem is that there is no consistent assignment of truthvalues, while in the latter the problem is that there are too many consistent
assignments (thus any assignment must involve an arbitrary choice as to
which truth-value should be assigned). 124
The notion of validity produces in law something which is akin to the
truth-teller paradox. Validity is the qualifying mark or label of legal
norms.125 It distinguishes between the law (rules) in force and that which
is not law. In other words: ‘Law which is not valid is not law’.126
Determining the validity of norms is thus of critical importance; it is
essential to the formation of normative expectations and is also a critical
component of legal decision-making. It is the validity of the law that
makes its normative statements binding. While non-legal prescriptive
statements also 'purport' to be binding they invoke other reasons for their
'bindingness'.127 But validity is not only a mark unique to law; it can only
be endowed and transferred according to law. The concept of validity thus
holds an inevitable circularity: Validity can only be determined
recursively, that is, by reference to valid law.128 Because norms cannot be
evaluated through the logical prism of truth and falsity, the concept of
validity can operate as a plausible alternative.129 Consider, for example,
the following set of rules (“the Paradox of Validity”):
124

See, Roy Sorensen, Vagueness and Contradiction (2001) at 167. See also Herzberger,
supra note 21, at 150
125

Csaba Varga, Validity, 41 Acta Juridica Hungarica 155, 155.

126

See Luhmann, above n 40, at 125.

127

See Vranas, supra note 34, at section 3, for a discussion of the notion of bindingness.

128

See Luhmann, ibid, at 128 and Varga, supra note 110, at 155-6.

129

See, on that also, Vladimir Svoboda, Forms of Norms and Validity 80 Poznan Studies
in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 223, 229 (2003). As in classical
logic, I assume bivalence, ie, a binary distinction between valid/not-valid. While validity
resembles in some aspects the notion of truth, it does not generate the same kind of
paradoxes. Thus, for example, the notion of validity does not yield a paradox parallel to
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Rule 1.1: This rule, and all the rules enumerated below, are valid.
Rule 2.1. …
Rule 2.2 …
Rule 2.3. …
…
Rule 2.n. …
This sequence of rules can have (at least) two consistent assignments of
validity values. The first, in which both the Rule 1.1 (‘meta rule’) and all
the other rules (‘secondary rules’) are valid, and another one, in which
both the meta rule and all the secondary rules are invalid.130 The TruthTeller Paradox generates a similar problem of multiple (consistent)
assignments of truth and falsity.

the liar. Consider the following example: Imagine that you open the Civil Code which is
in force in your country. In page 100 to the Code you find rule number 499 which states:

499. This rule is not valid.

What is the meaning of this sentence? Consider, first, the option that rule 499 is valid,
that is, it represents the law in force. If it is valid, then what it says is valid as well, and
since it says about itself that it is not valid, this must be valid as well. Contradiction.
Assume, alternatively, that rule 499 is not valid. Then, what it says about itself is indeed
the case, and no contradiction arises. (Strictly speaking, if a rule is not valid, what it says
is legally irrelevant.) Unlike the Liar Paradox, there is a simple way out here, which
requires us to assume that rule 499 is not valid. This leaves us with the riddle of how and
why this sentence was incorporated into the Code in the first place.
130

The qualification ‘at least’ is necessary, because once we assume that the Meta rule is
not valid, there can be multiple assignments of validity, which attribute different values to
the Secondary rules.
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Note, however, that there are important differences between the paradox
of validity and the truth-teller paradox. In the context of the latter it is
possible to argue that the sentences included in the truth teller sequence,
are vacuous or under-specified. This reflects the fact that these sentences
do not supply a concrete truth-condition by which their truth or falsity may
be determined. They fail to yield a statement.131 The parallel legal
sequence is not vacuous. Even if we consider it invalid its deontic content
is not lost. The normative statements simply lose the colour of law. They
become non-legal norms.
The foregoing paradox reflects one of the deepest dilemmas of modern
law: On the one hand, we feel uncomfortable with the thought that law
validates itself; on the other hand, this is exactly what is expected from the
law according to the modern conception of validity – that is, that validity
can only be endowed according to law. The assumption that the criteria
and authority for determining the validity of norms must be instituted
through valid law thus generates a vicious circularity, which seems to be
logically irresolvable.
At this point, it might make sense to turn to philosophy. Perhaps we can
gain some inspiration from the various strategies invoked by philosophers
to resolve the puzzle of semantical paradoxes. Let me briefly sketch some
of the attempts to resolve these paradoxes.132 Alfred Tarski proposed to
resolve the puzzle of the liar paradox by replacing our everyday, singular
understanding of truth with a multi-level linguistic framework. According
to this construction, one is able to speak meaningfully about the truth of
statements in one language (the ‘object-language’) only in a language that
131

Transforming K1 into a bi-conditional thus yields the following vacuous sentence: K1
is true if and only if K1 is true. In contrast, in proper statements such transformation
makes perfect sense. Consider: K2 Leaves are green. The sentence K2 is true if and only
leaves are green is fully specified. See further Laurence Goldstein, Fibonacci, Yablo, and
the Cassationist Approach to Paradox 115 Mind 867, 884-5 (2006).
132

For a general discussion, see, eg, Sainsbury, above n 9 and Rescher, above n 8. An
important solution strategy which I will not discuss is based on rejecting (some) of the
assumptions of classical logic (eg, the law of excluded middle). For this approach, see,
for example, G Priest, ‘What Is So Bad about Contradictions’ (1998) 95 The Journal of
Philosophy 410.
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is located higher on the linguistic hierarchy than the object language and
whose expressive capacities are essentially richer (the ‘meta-language’).133
Another approach takes as given the non-hierarchical character of natural
language. It proposes to resolve the riddle of the liar and truth-teller
paradoxes by arguing that groundless sentences are intrinsically illformed, and should be excluded from the realm of statements – statement
being understood as a sentence that is used to say something true or
false.134 Groundless sentences, it is argued, while grammatically correct,
fail to make any statement; they are, in other words, ‘truth-incompetent’.
And since these sentences are truth-incompetent, it makes no sense to ask
whether they are true or false.135 Laurence Goldstein argues that the reason
why liar-like sentences generate such awe and confusion is not because of
any deep logical problematic, but rather, because of certain deep-seated
beliefs and preconceptions that characterize human thought. Underlying
the semantical paradoxes is our naïve intuition that ‘the paradoxical
sentences because they are not ungrammatical, vague or sortally suspect
and encompass no false presuppositions, must yield statements when
used’.136 The analysis of these paradoxes thus seems to belong more to the
realm of psychology than to the realm of logic.
In effect, the foregoing approaches introduce, though for different reasons,
a general ban on self-reference and other forms of groundlessness.
However, this ban may seem too strict for and incongruent with our
intuitions regarding the use of language. An alternative approach is offered
133

Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics
(1944) 3 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 341, at 350-1.
134

Statement, following Goldstein, is understood as ‘a truth-bearer, a used sentence –
“used” not in the sense just of being uttered out loud (a pheme) or written down (a
grapheme) but in the sense of being used to say something true or false’ Goldstein, above
n 30, at 54.
135

Goldstein, ibid, at 58.

136

Ibid, at 69.
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by the model of naïve semantics, articulated by Hans Herzberger. The
essence of this approach is the following:
In naive semantics, paradoxes are allowed to arise freely and to work their
own way out. No semantic defences are to be set up against them. … No
effort will be made to eliminate the paradoxes, to suppress them, or in any
way to interfere and take deliberate action against them. They are to
unfold according to their own inner principles. In its early stages naive
semantics may appear somewhat haphazard and even chaotic. Gradually
some islands of stability will emerge and grow until eventually everything
has resettled into a new but orderly arrangement.137
Instead of trying to break or suppress the semantic instability associated
with semantical paradoxes – their oscillation between true and false –
naive semantics calls us to embrace it. This can be achieved by exposing
the pattern through which paradoxical statements change their value at
different stages of evaluation.138 Naïve semantics thus rejects any attempt
to classify liar-like sentences as neither true nor false or both true and
false. Their fundamental semantic character is neither a truth value nor the
absence of a truth value, but a valuational pattern that has certain
regularities. By demonstrating that paradoxical sentences follow certain
regularities, naïve semantics shows ‘how a language could contain

137

138

Herzberger, above n 22, at 482.

This valuation technique consists of two phases: ‘Each statement undergoes two
phases of evaluation, either of which can be trivially simple or, within fixed bounds,
extremely complicated. Each statement can be assigned two characteristic ordinal
numbers: a stabilization point and a fundamental periodicity. The stabilization point for a
statement marks the earliest stage at which its valuations become periodic, and its
periodicity marks the length of its valuational cycle’, Herzberger, ibid, at 492. Thus, for
example, the looped liar that was discussed above (the Plato-Socrates dialogue) is cyclic
with periodicity 4. Starting with the assumption that Plato’s statement is true leads you to
conclude that Socrates’ statement is true, next that Plato’s statement is in fact false,
Socrates’ statement is false, returning to the original evaluation that Plato’s statement is
true. So if we attribute the values (1, 0) to (true, false) we get the following cyclical
pattern: 11001100… .
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paradoxical statements and nevertheless have a systematic and coherent
semantic structure’.139
What are the implications of the philosophical struggle with semantical
paradoxes to the study of the paradox of validity? Consider, first, Tarski’s
hierarchical conception of truth. To apply Tarski’s proposal to law, one
would have to assume a hierarchy of laws in which the validity of the
lower-level normative layer could only be determined through the prism of
a higher law. This hierarchical conceptualization of validity is
inconsistent, however, with our practical experience of law as a unitary
system. So maybe, following the philosophical strategy of barring
groundless sentences, we should impose a ban on groundless normative
structures? This solution raises many difficulties: first, because the idea
that validity should only be endowed according to law has deep roots in
the moral and political culture of the Western world, and second, because
it is not clear what constitute a proper grounding for a global norm.
The answer to the question of legal paradoxicality lies elsewhere, and
requires, as will be argued below, a conceptual switch. This alternative
approach has some resonance with the dynamic vision of naïve semantics.

C. THE PRAXIS OF PARADOX: FROM PURITY TO SYSTEM
DYNAMICS
Exploring the puzzle of legal paradoxes requires a departure from the
philosophical and logical approach to the study of paradoxes. The
philosophical inquiry has been guided by the idea that paradoxes represent
a certain malady of thought that should somehow be eliminated, prevented

139

Herzberger, ibid, at 497
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or resolved.140 One of the main tasks of logic is to free us from this
disease.141
The philosophical approach is not applicable to law because the notion of
paradox – in its philosophical and logical connotations – does not apply to
law in its social instantiation.142 This has to do with the fact that paradoxes
are properties of sentences.143 Because law, as a social system, is not
reducible to sentences (eg, norms), it cannot be, strictly speaking,
‘paradoxical’ - although it can be depicted as self-referential, selforganizing or self-producing.144 The paradoxes of law emerge as sentential
140

Thus, Alfred Tarski has noted in one of his papers: ‘The appearance of an antinomy is
for me a symptom of disease’; Alfred Tarski, Truth and Proof, 220 Scientific American
63, 66 (1969).
141

Nicholas Rescher observes: The ‘prime directive of rationality is to restore consistency
in such situations’. Rescher, supra note 12, at 9; see also Chihara, supra note 13, at 5901.
142

The gap between the logical and legal planes remained unnoticed by some legal
scholars. Thus, for example, George Fletcher, in his article on ‘Paradoxes in Legal
Thought’, notes: "This Article commits itself to logical consistency as the indispensable
foundation for effective dialogue and coherent criticism. Only if we accept consistency as
an overriding legal value will we be troubled by the paradoxes and antinomies that lie
latent in our undeveloped systems of legal thought. Grappling with uncovered paradoxes
and antinomies will impel us toward consistent theoretical structures". George P.
Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 Columbia Law Review 1263, 1264-5 (1985).

143

I use the term ‘sentence’ to denote a string of words satisfying the grammatical
rules of a language (see the WordNet 2.0 dictionary, available at
http://wordnet.princeton.edu). This broad definition includes sentences in the form of
both statements and norms. Statements (or claims), unlike norms, are truth-bearers; they
can be true or false, see Goldstein, above n 30, at 54.

144

One of the key lessons of the social analysis of law is the understanding that the
essence of law cannot be captured by simply enumerating its normative content. This
point has been forcefully made by Gunther Teubner and Niklas Luhmann. Describing the
law as a system of rules or a system of symbols, Teubner argues, provides no answer to
the dynamic property of law, to its self-regulatory capacity: ‘For how are norms to
produce norms or symbols to generate symbols? We can only conceive of the law
producing itself if we understand it no longer as a mere system of rules but as a system of
actions’, Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (1997) at 18. See, further, on
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reflections of its unique systemic structure: of its self-organizing and selfproducing features. A self-organizing system is a system that not only
regulates or adapts its behaviour, but creates its own organization. Selfproduction (or autopoiesis) denotes the process by which a system
recursively produces its own network of components (in the case of law:
communication ordered by the distinction legal/illegal), thus continuously
regenerating its essential organization in the face of external perturbations
and internal erosion.145 Self-organizing and self-producing systems are
intrinsically circular and self-referential.146
Recognizing that the paradoxes of law are reflections of its unique
systemic structure indicates that the notion of purity does not provide a
suitable guide for the study of legal paradoxicality.147 One cannot purify
the law from its paradoxes, because they reflect vital steering and
stabilizing mechanisms, without which the law would not be able to
that point, Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System (2004), at 98-105, 177 and Neil
MacCormick, Norms, Institutions, and institutional Facts, 17 Law and Philosophy 301,
330-1 (1998).
145

See Francis Heylighen, ‘The Science of Self-organization and Adaptivity’ in The
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS Publishers, 2001), available at
http://www.eolss.net, and Francis Heylighen and Cliff Joslyn, ‘Cybernetics and Second
Order Cybernetics’, in RA Meyers (ed.), Encyclopedia of Physical Science & Technology
vol 4 (3rd ed) (2001) 155-170.
146

In mathematical terms these forms of circularity can be modelled by an equation
representing how some phenomenon or variable y is mapped onto itself by a
transformation or process f: y = f(y). To make sense of this equation one needs to
explicate what y and f stand for. For a more detailed analysis see, Heylighen and Joslyn,
ibid, at section III(A).
147

The notion of purification is invoked, for example, by Nicholas Rescher, see Rescher,
supra note 12, at 31. Rescher himself provides some support for the foregoing thesis in
his distinction between the practical and theoretical contexts. In practical contexts,
Rescher argues, ‘there is a possibility of compromise – of affecting a division that enables
us in some way and to some extent “to have it both ways”, say, to proceed A-wise on
even days and B-wise on odd ones. But we cannot rationally do this with beliefs. In
theoretical contexts we must choose – must resolve the issue on way or another’,
Rescher, ibid, at 11.
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counteract external pressures.148 The static perspective which characterises
the study of paradoxes in logic is not suited for that task because it is not
sensitive to the social dynamics underlying the paradoxes of law.149 The
circular quality of the concept of validity is therefore an inevitable feature
of legal communication. This circularity does not undermine the
normative unity of the legal system because the mark of validity is taken
for granted in the recursive operations of the law.150 Further, in functional
terms this circularity provides the law with far-reaching flexibility – by
empowering it to create and destruct normative structures in response to
conflicting social pressures.

VI. THE POLYMORPHOSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
The groundlessness of law is not, then, a new problem. Still I will argue
that the paradoxicality of the contemporary system of international law
constitutes a novel phenomenon. What is unique in the structure of the
international legal system is not the impurity of our forms of validation,
but the emergence of multiple validating techniques, which are invoked,
148

It is simply wrong, therefore, to view consistency, as Fletcher does, ‘as an overriding
legal value’ (although the appearance of consistency – concealing the paradox – could
have instrumental value).
149

A notable exception is naïve semantics, which as we saw earlier, emphasises the
dynamic aspect of semantical paradoxes. See also Patrick Grim, Gary Mar, Paul St.
Denis, The Philosophical Computer: Exploratory Essays in Philosophical Computer
Modeling (1998), chapter 1. However these attempts, which are based on the idea of
iterated functional sequences, do not capture the innovative feature of the law – its
capacity to produce unpredictable surprises.

150

This is why law cannot include a right to revolution. This idea was nicely captured by
an old English verse dealing with the paradox of treason (quoted by Josef Kunz):
"Treason cannot prosper, What's the reason? For if it does, who would dare to call it
treason?"; Josef L. Kunz, Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law, 41 The
American Journal of International Law 119, 121 (fn. 6) (1947).
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simultaneously, at the forefront of the international legal body. The global
legal system has moved from a state of (imaginary) purity to a state of
multiple paradoxicalities – a process of polymorphosis – leading to a much
more complex juridical universe. But what are the social implications of
this process? In order to answer this question, let me first outline the key
types of deep inconsistencies that afflict the contemporary universe of
international law.

Horizontal inconsistent sources of validation. There is no
universally agreed concept of validity. Different international regimes use
different notions of validity (compare the World Trade Organization
regime to the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of
Arbitration). In some cases this form of inconsistency leads to transregime conflicts (e.g., the clash between treaty and contractual obligations
in the investment domain, and the clash between consent and technology
in Internet law).

Internal inconsistency. Within the same legal regime it is possible
to find conflicting conceptions of validity, pulling in different directions
(e.g., the cases of the WTO and the International Criminal Court).

The incorporation of vague sources of validity (from morality to
science). Vagueness yields conflicting interpretations both within
particular regimes and across regimes (e.g., the new principle of 'civilian
inviolability' and the 'precautionary principle').
Together these multiple inconsistencies bring forth a legal universe whose
complexity is multidimensional. The complexity of modern international
law cannot be captured through reference to the heterogeneous
institutional reality of multiple legal tribunals. Its complexity runs deeper,
covering many layers of legal praxis and challenging the traditional
boundaries and tenets of international law (such as the distinction between
public and private international law). But what are the possible
repercussions of the polymorphosis process? In the following sections I
want to explore this question by considering the influence of the
polymorphosis process on the structure and autonomy of the global legal
system, on its stability and its relationship with other systems of
governance, and on its external legitimacy. Responding to these questions
requires us to move from the realm of historic-analytic analysis into the
realm of futuristic socio-legal analysis. This move also makes the
following discussion much more explorative (even speculative).
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A. FROM COLONIZATION TO INTERNAL COMPLEXIFICATION: THE
EMERGENCE OF COSMOPOLITAN LAW
The polymorphosis process can be postulated as a reflection of the
colonization, or instrumentalization of the global legal system by
multifarious external systems.151 There are certainly voices who argue that
this colonization is wide-spread, with the finger being pointed in particular
to the global economic system or the so called 'Washington consensus'.
Economic rationality and economic institutions (in all their different
embodiments, public and private) it is argued, are actually calling the
shots; the law – from the WTO to the climate change convention –
operates as a mere façade for economic calculations and corporate
interests.152 While this argument has some merit I do not find it convincing
as an explanation for the diverse processes depicted above. There are two
151

For the risk of the colonization of global law by external sources see, eg, FischerLescano, supra note 73.
152

See, e.g. David Held, Globalisation: the Dangers and the Answers, openDemocracy,
27 May 2004 http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/1918.pdf; WILLIAM
FINNEGAN, The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington Consensus, Harper's
Magazine
May
2003,
http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/Economics-OfEmpireMay03.htm; Noam Chomsky, The Passion for Free Markets Exporting American
values
through
the
new
World
Trade
Organization,
http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/may97chomsky.html. Noam Chomsky provides a
proto-typical formulation of the colonization argument. Referring to the WTO agreement
on telecommunications he argues that "the 'new tool' allows the U.S. to intervene
profoundly in the internal affairs of others, compelling them to change their laws and
practices. Crucially, the WTO will make sure that other countries are 'following through
on their commitments to allow foreigners to invest' without restriction in central areas of
their economy. In the specific case at hand, the likely outcome is clear to all: 'The
obvious corporate beneficiaries of this new era will be U.S. carriers, who are best
positioned to dominate a level playing field' (ibid). In a similar fashion the bundling of
law and technology can be viewed as an "automatic" mechanism, which is controlled by
private firms - and serves their interests. Margaret Radin has argued recently that this new
form of machine-implemented self-enforcement reflects the replacement of the law of the
legislature by the law of the firm; Radin, supra note 98, at 1233.
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main reasons for my skepticism. First, the diversity and complexity of the
different validation techniques – reflecting both their horizontal
incompatibilities and their internal fuzziness – makes this argument
unconvincing. The empirical argument that served to reject Kunz's purity
thesis, by questioning its coherence, likewise serves to reject this totalistic
Marxist critique (by similarly questioning its coherence). Second, the
search for grounding, which underlies all of the forms of validation
discussed in section IV, reflects a common adherence to the concept of
'normativity'. Indeed the quest for validity can only make sense within the
realm of law.153
The polymorphosis process represents therefore something else - an
internally generated process of complexification. It is a purely internal
phenomenon: an internally driven reconstruction of law's groundings with
the law reacting – but not yielding - to external sources. 154 The appeal to
democracy, science, morality, direct consent and technology does not
signal the colonization of law but, rather, an extension of the horizon of
possibilities through which international law, in its various realizations,
can react to external pressures. But the polymorphosis process represents a
deeper message. It brings forth a new kind of global law – a truly
cosmopolitan phenomenon. The unity of this new body of global laws
does not derive from the ideal of national sovereignty or from some
projected global hierarchy;155 rather, it is constituted through a common
appeal to the concepts of normativity and grounding – which are
postulated as universally applicable distinctions.

153

See, Varga, supra note 110, at 164.

154

This does not mean that the question of the grounding of law is not discussed in nonlegal domains, such as politics or philosophy; however, from internal perspective this
external deliberation appears as noise.
155

Hence it is no longer true to argue that "national sovereignty is the condition of global
law and global law is the condition of sovereignty being possible". eg, Fischer-Lescano,
supra note 73, at section V. Neither can such unity be found in the International Court of
Justice as the apex of some postulated hierarchy. See, Koskenniemi and Leino, supra
note 118, at 577.
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B. PARADOX, DIVERSITY AND RESILIENCE
The polymorphosis process does not seem to reflect, then, the subjugation
of the law by external forces. However, the impact of this process on the
functional operation of the law, and on its relationship with other systems
of governance, still constitutes an unresolved problematic. This
problematic raises two questions: first, could the multiple forms of selfreference and inconsistencies associated with the polymorphosis process
lead to irresolvable conflicts within and between regimes, bringing
ultimately to the total paralysis of the global legal system?156 Second, and
in light of this possibility, could the entanglement of the law in its internal
paradoxes lead to the expansion of other social systems (economics,
politics, morality and religion), leading simultaneously to the contraction
of global law as problems migrate to other systems?
Systems theory recognizes operational paralysis and structural
disintegration as a possible trajectory in the life of ecological and social
systems.157 However, this conjecture is not the most plausible account of
the future direction of the contemporary global legal system. I argue that
the complexity and diversity of contemporary body of law⎯the
proliferation of validation techniques⎯should be seen, at this point, as a
source of strength rather than weakness. This complexity contributes to the
156

For this possibility see: Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, RegimeCollisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 999 (2004) and Greg C. Shaffer and Mark
A. Pollack, Regulating Risk in a Global Economy: The United States, Europe, and
Agricultural Biotechnology, (forthcoming), chapter 1.

157

See, e.g., Folke, et al. REGIME SHIFTS, RESILIENCE, AND BIODIVERSITY IN
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, 35 Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and
Systematics 557, 567; Ahmet E.
Kideys, Fall and Rise of the Black Sea Ecosystem 297 (5586) Science 1482 (2002); Brian
Walker and Jacqueline A. Meyers, Thresholds in Ecological and Social–Ecological
Systems: a Developing Database, 9 Ecology and Society 3, 12 (2004).
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resilience of the global legal system and enhances its ability to respond to
external pressures. The legal anxiety associated with the possibility of
regime-collisions and normative contradictions158 confuses the micro level
(the ramifications of a local dispute, e.g., between the WTO regime and
the Kyoto Protocol) and the macro level – the resilience of the global legal
system in its totality.
This argument draws on the study of the relation between systemresilience and diversity in ecology. The concept of resilience is used in
ecology to denote the width or limit of a stability domain of an ecological
system and is defined by the "magnitude of disturbance that a system can
absorb before it changes stable states".159 Bio-diversity is defined as a
measure of two features of ecological system: functional-group diversity
and functional-response diversity. Functional-group diversity measures the
diversity of the eco-system in terms of groups of species that fulfill
different functions (e.g., species may pollinate, graze, predate, fix
nitrogen, etc.). The persistence of functional groups contributes to the
performance of ecosystems and the services that they generate. Loss of a
major functional group, such as apex predators, may cause drastic
alterations in ecosystem functioning. Functional-response diversity is
defined in terms of the diversity of responses to environmental change
among species that contribute to the same ecosystem function. Variability
in responses to environmental change within the same functional group is
critical to ecosystem resilience.160
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See, for example, in Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, supra note 156 and Rosalyn
Higgins, A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, Keynote speech given
by President Rosalyn Higgins at the Spring Meeting of the International Law Association
on 4 March 2006, 55 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 791 (2006), at 792.
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See: Lance Gunderson, Ecological Resilience - In Theory and Application, 31 Annu.
Rev. Ecol. Syst. 425, 427 (2000). Folke et al define resilience similarly as "the capacity
of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to retain
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks"; Folke et al, ibid, at 558.
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Folke et al, ibid, at 570.
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There is an increasing consensus among ecologists that bio-diversity
contributes to systems resilience by increasing sources of renewal and
reorganization and by providing a rich response horizon.161 Generally
biodiversity provides a cross-scale resilience. Species combine to form an
overlapping set of reinforcing influences, spreading risks and benefits
widely, and thus retaining overall consistency in performance,
independent of wide fluctuations in the individual species.162 Diversity is
thus postulated as an evolutionary achievement.
Applying biological concepts to the study of social processes is not a
trivial exercise. The following comments constitute a first step in a more
wide-ranging investigation of the applicability of this biological research
to the social sciences.163 In the context of law, resilience may be
understood in terms of the capacity of the legal system to withstand
external colonization attempts (reflecting a shift from autonomy to
allonomy)164 or its capacity to maintain a certain level of communicative
activity (with different levels representing different states). The diversity
of validation techniques constitutes a form of functional-response
diversity. It provides the law with multiple avenues to respond to external

161

Folke et al, ibid, at 572.
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Gunderson, supra note 159, at 431. The distribution of functional diversity within and
across scales allows regeneration and renewal to occur following ecological disruption
over a wide range of scales (with scale defined as a range of spatial and temporal
frequencies, Garry Peterson, Craig R. Allen and C. S. Holling, Ecological Resilience,
Biodiversity, and Scale, 1 Ecosystems 6, 11, 16 (1998)).
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For other attempts to use biological ideas in the study of social systems, see: Niklas
Luhmann, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1995) (the idea of autopoiesis, 12-58, 34-36 in particular)
and Francis Heylighen, supra note 145, at 24 (the concept of self-organization).
164

Allonomy, literally meaning external law, refers to the situation in which a system is
regulated or controlled from outside; Francisco J. Varela, F. J. Principles of Biological
Autonomy, (1979) xi.
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pressures, maintaining, nonetheless its normative unity (against competing
social orders).165
This diversity – which in the legal domain is translated into paradoxical
tensions at the meta-normative level - has advantages at both the microregime level and the macro-meta-system level. Let me give a few concrete
examples. In the case of the WTO, the friction between the autonomy of
the legal system and its apparent commitment to the Westphalian
paradigm allows the law to proceed with its internally driven conceptual
innovation while still relying on the legitimacy produced by the ideal of
state consent.166 The reference to external validating sources – such as
science and environmental ethics – further enriches the response horizon
of WTO law. In the case of the lex mercatoria, the tension between
disaggregated contractual sources and a permanent institutional and
doctrinal apparatus allows the law to develop deep sensitivities to the
needs of the global economic system within a stable institutional
infrastructure, which provides the system with memory and coherence
(despite its underlying fragmented foundations). The reliance on (and
development of) universal private law doctrines, operating as a common
conceptual grid, constitutes a further source of validity and stability. At the
meta-regime level, the interplay between the different validation sources
allows the legal system to respond to multiple social needs despite
political and economic constraints. Thus, for example, the Global
Reporting Initiative, by invoking the principles of consensual decision
making and sustainable development, has initiated successfully a new
global scheme dealing with corporate reporting in a field in which the
conventional treaty-making route would have faced formidable obstacles.
The lesson from the biological discussion of diversity and resilience seems
to be clear: there is a value in diversity in both its institutional and
normative dimensions. In terms of institutional design, this suggests, I will
165

Diversity contributes, therefore, to the continuance of (transnational) legal
communication (see, Heylighen & Joslyn, supra note 145, at section IV(A)). To the
extent that law is taken as a better way for resolving societal conflicts (e.g., relative to
force) this result has important moral value.
166

See, Picciotto, supra note 50, at 496 in particular.
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argue, a shift from models of institutional hierarchy and normative unity to
reflexive models, which maintain this diversity and the paradoxical
frictions associated with it.167 I will say more about that in section VII

C. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GLOBAL
LEGAL SYSTEM
Finally a key question is to what extent the paradoxes of validity influence
the (external) legitimacy of international law. This question requires us to
distinguish between moral and sociological understandings of legitimacy.
Legitimacy in the moral, normative sense refers to the right to rule. Allen
Buchanan and Robert Keohane argue that in the case of global institutions
the right to rule should be understood to mean "both that institutional
agents are morally justified in making rules and attempting to secure
compliance with them and that people subject to those rules have moral,
content-independent reasons to follow them and/or to not interfere with
others’ compliance with them".168 Legitimacy in a sociological sense is a
measure of belief. From a sociological perspective an institution is
legitimate when it is widely believed to have the right to rule.169
Legitimacy is therefore a subjective quality, defined by the perception of
the institution in the eyes of the individual.170 There is a sharp distinction
between sociological and normative perspectives. From a sociological
perspective making a claim about the legitimacy of certain global
institutions should not be seen as a "moral claim about the universal
legitimacy, or even less the moral worth, of any particular international
167

For a similar conclusion see Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, supra note 156, at
1004.
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My emphasis. Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global
Governance Institutions, 20 Ethics & International Affairs 405, 411 (2006).
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Buchanan and Keohane, ibid, at 405.

Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 International
Organization 379, 381 (1999).
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rule".171 This understanding of the sociological aspect of legitimacy
provides, however, only part of the picture because it focuses exclusively
on the individual perspective. One can also take a systemic-institutional
view of legitimacy. This perspective conceptualizes legitimacy as a
measure of the capacity of the law to maintain its autonomy and as a
measure of the growth or contraction of legal communication.
In exploring the relation between legitimacy and validity I want to focus
on one concrete question: what are the implications of the autological and
increasingly heterogeneous character of the concept of validity for the
legitimacy of global law? I will start with the moral aspect of legitimacy
and will then consider the sociological aspect. Initially one can take the
view that the validity of the law is irrelevant to the question of legitimacy.
Legitimacy is a moral measure, which is determined by moral
considerations; as such, it should not be influenced by internal legal
constructions. However, as Buchanan and Keohane demonstrate, the moral
legitimacy of international legal institutions is also a function of the
operational dynamics of the legal system. To the extent that the various
paradoxes of validity influence this dynamic they can also influence the
legitimacy of the law.
Buchanan and Keohane make a two-fold argument in this context. They
argue, first, that legitimacy is primarily an instrumental measure. "The
basic reason for states or other addressees of institutional rules to take
them as binding and for individuals generally to support or at least to not
interfere with the operation of these institutions is that they provide
benefits that cannot otherwise be obtained. If an institution cannot
effectively perform the functions invoked to justify its existence, then this
insufficiency undermines its claim to the right to rule".172 Second,
Buchanan and Keohane suggest that part of the legitimacy of global
governance institutions lies in certain epistemic-deliberative qualities. In
particular they argue that to be legitimate a global governance institution
must create the conditions for ongoing critical contestation of its goals and
171

Hurd, ibid, at 381.
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Buchanan and Keohane, supra note 168, at 422.
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terms of accountability, through interaction with agents and organizations
outside the institution.173 Achieving such epistemic responsiveness
requires that the institution to be both transparent and open to dialogue
with external epistemic actors.174
The question then is in what way does the autological and increasingly
heterogeneous quality of the concept of validity influence these two
measures of legitimacy? If one adopts the view that the unfolding
incoherence of the international legal system could lead to operational
paralysis, one could conclude this will ultimately reduce the legitimacy of
the international legal system. If, on the other hand, one adopts the view
that this heterogeneity contributes to the resilience of the global legal
system and to its capacity to cope with the range of problems facing the
global society (as I have argued above), then it is reasonable to assume
that this heterogeneity should contribute to the legitimacy of the
international legal body.
The paradoxes of validity could also enhance the legitimacy of
international institutions by contributing to their epistemic responsiveness.
The autological character of the transnational legal system turns it into a
highly innovative system. It is, in the words of Heinz von Foerster, a nontrivial machine. Non-trivial machines – unlike trivial machines such as
cars and mobile phones – are highly disobedient and unpredictable. In
non-trivial machines "a response once observed for a given stimulus may
not be the same for the same stimulus given later".175 The autological
nature of the law allows it to continuously challenge its traditional
173

Buchanan and Keohane, ibid, at 406, 432.
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Buchanan and Keohane, ibid, at 432.
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Heinz von Foerster, Principles of Self-Organization - In a Socio-Managerial Context.
Self-Organization and Management of Social Systems: Insights, Promises, Doubts, and
Questions. H. Ulrich and G. J. B. Probst, eds. (1984) 10. See also Hanno Kaiser
"Normativity, Trivial Machines, and Punishment." Law & Society Blog - Notes from the
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doctrines, analogies, and conceptual constructs. The broad ensemble of
validating techniques which characterize the global legal system further
enriches this self-reflection process. One of the main virtues of this selfreferential dynamic is that it provides some guarantee against domination
and exclusion. By creating an opening for a change it provides a room and
hope for critical voices. In a world that cherishes diversity of life forms,
this competency constitutes an important virtue.176 The deep heterogeneity
of the global legal system seems to cohere better with the cultural diversity
of the global society.
The sociological connection between legitimacy and validity constitutes a
difficult question. From a systemic perspective I have argued that the
paradoxes of validity may contribute to the resilience of the law, and in
that sense may contribute also to its legitimacy (understood as a measure
of legal autonomy and the intensity of legal communication). Decoding
the influence of paradoxes of validity on individual perceptions of
legitimacy provides a difficult psychological puzzle. First, because of the
low visibility of the paradoxes of validity, it is uncertain to what extent
they affect the perception of global law within the wide public. If people
are not aware of the incoherence and auto-logical character of the current
global law, this fact will not affect their normative beliefs. Second, these
features may influence subjective beliefs in different ways. Incoherence,
for example may cause a loss of legitimacy by portraying law as a field in
which decisions are made in a chaotic and arbitrary fashion. The selfreferential nature of validity may put in doubt the bindingness of law - its
capacity to provide content-independent reasons for action. Law has
developed, however, doctrinal mechanisms that can cope with these
questions (e.g., the use of vague concepts).177
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See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF
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The cognitive reaction to legal paradoxes is still an under-explored
question. So let me conclude this discussion by looking at the findings of a
recent article, which explored the cognitive repercussions of the similar
truth-teller paradox. Shira Elqayam explored the way reasoners evaluate
Truthteller-type propositions (‘‘I am telling the truth’’) and Liar-type
propositions (‘‘I am lying’’). It found, through two experiments, the
existence of a ‘‘collapse illusion’’, in which reasoners evaluate
Truthteller-type propositions as if they were simply true, whereas Liartype propositions tend to be evaluated as neither true nor false. This
psychological result is inconsistent with the philosophical view of
Truthteller-type propositions, which considers them as hopelessly
indeterminate.178 Elqayam offers several psychological explanations for
this phenomenon which we cannot consider in detail here.179 However, it
would be interesting to explore whether a similar phenomenon exists also
in the case of validity.

VII. FROM GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM TO
CONTEXTUAL REFLEXIVITY
Modern international law is impure, messy and complex. But the attempts
to purify it through appeals to grand theories - constitutional, moral or
other - are ill-conceived.180 First, because they fail to recognize the innate
paradoxicality of law. Second, because they constitute a threat to the
legitimacy and resilience of the global legal system. The study of diversity
and resilience in the ecological domain demonstrates the systemic value of
178

Shira Elqayam, The Collapse Illusion Effect: A Semantic-pragmatic Illusion of Truth
and Paradox, 12 THINKING & REASONING 144 (2006).

179

180

Ibid, at 150.

Echoes to this purifying mode can be found, for example, in the 'constitutional
moment' hypothesis of Slaughter and Burke-White (supra note 73), in David Held's
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diversity. In terms of institutional design, it suggests a shift from unifying
models, based on hierarchical normative and institutional structures to
reflexive models, which could enhance and support the diversity of the
global legal system. Indeed, as the concepts of normativity and rule of law
become entrenched in the communicative fabric of the global society,
there is more room for experimenting with novel reflexive institutional
structures.
I would like to conclude this article with two examples of highly reflexive
legal structures. Underlying both examples is the idea of distributed
authority. Such more refined authority configurations provide richer
opportunities for internal dialogue, self-contestation and conceptual
innovation. The price, though, is some loss of coherence. The two
examples demonstrate how the use of reflexive structure can affect both
the micro- dynamic of a single regime, and the inter-play between several
regimes. The examples also differ in their model of distributed authority
and in the construction of their reflexive dynamic.
My first example focuses on the Global Reporting Initiative ('GRI'). The
GRI was founded in 1997 by the Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies in partnership with the United Nations
Environment Programme. The GRI is based on three, and potentially
conflicting pillars: first, a commitment to multi-stakeholder decisionmaking; second, an ideological commitment to the ethos of sustainable
development; third, a formal, hierarchical institutional structure. The
commitment to consensual decision-making is reflected for example in the
text of the G3 Sustainability Guidelines (2006):181
"Transparency about the sustainability of organizational activities is of
interest to a diverse range of stakeholders, including business, labor, non181

It also finds resonance in the description of the GRI in its website: "The 'Global
Reporting Initiative' is a large multi-stakeholder network of thousands of experts, in
dozens of countries worldwide, who participate in GRI’s working groups and governance
bodies, use the GRI Guidelines to report, access information in GRI-based reports, or
contribute to develop the Reporting Framework in other ways – both formally and
informally";
GRI,
Who
we
are,
at
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/, visited 8 march 2007.

66

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

governmental organizations, investors, accountancy, and others. This is
why GRI has relied on the collaboration of a large network of experts from
all of these stakeholder groups in consensus-seeking consultations. These
consultations, together with practical experience, have continuously
improved the Reporting Framework since GRI’s founding in 1997. This
multi-stakeholder approach to learning has given the Reporting
Framework the widespread credibility it enjoys with a range of
stakeholder groups"
The commitment to the value of sustainable development is set out in the
G3 Guidelines. Thus, the Guidelines open with the famous definition of
sustainability provided in the World Commission on Environment and
Development report 'Our Common Future'.182 In addition to its the
commitments to multi-stakeholder consultation and sustainable
development the GRI is also based on a carefully designed hierarchical
structure. The GRI is run by a Board of Directors and a Secretariat. The
Board has "the ultimate fiduciary, financial and legal responsibility for the
GRI, including final decision making authority on GRI Guidelines
revisions, organizational strategy, and work plans".183 The Secretariat is
responsible for implementing "the technical work plan set by the Board of
Directors".184 While the Stakeholder Council185 is supposed to provide a
182

The goal of sustainable development is to “meet the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. World
Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987) 43.
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The GRI formal instruments of incorporation are not published on the website; I'm
relying therefore on the information that was made public on the website. See,
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It also supports "the operations of the Board of Directors, Stakeholder Council and
Technical
Advisory
Committee"http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/Secretariat/, visited 8
March 2007.
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The Stakeholder Council ('SC') has 60 members. It meets annually and constitutes "the
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approve nominations for the Board of Directors and to provide it with strategic
recommendations. The SC members are chosen by the Organizational Stakeholders. See
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kind of parliamentary scrutiny on with respect to the Board's decision
making processes, its formal powers are very limited. The Board has the
formal capacity to adopt policies that are inconsistent with the results of
the deliberation process and the ideological commitment to sustainable
development.
The tri-partite normative commitment of the GRI could potentially lead to
a range of irresolvable conflicts. Despite this potential for internal quarrels
the GRI has functioned in an admirable fashion over the last years. It has
produced two Reporting Guidelines over a period of 4 years (2002,
2006).186 These Guidelines have not only reflected a deep commitment to
ecological values - setting ambitious reporting standards that depart from
the conventional, economic-oriented accounting principles - but have also
influenced in a substantive way the reporting practices of Multinational
Corporations.187 The GRI reflexive structure seems to have provided the
organization with both innovative capacity and the legitimacy to carry out
its mission. Further, it succeeded in a domain in which progress through
the treaty-making route, would have been much more difficult.
My second example is based on the vision of judicial dialogue, drawing on
the mechanism of preliminary ruling which was developed in the
European Union. This mechanism can be used both in the context of single
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/StakeholderCouncil/
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/OrganizationalStakeholders/,
visited 8 March 2007.
186

See, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/ (visited 27
March 2007).
187

A survey published in 2005 by KPMG analysed trends in corporate responsibility
reporting among the world's top 250 companies of the Fortune 500 ('G250') and top 100
companies in 16 countries ('N100'); KPMG, International Survey of Corporate
Responsibility Reporting (2005). The report found that sustainability reporting has now
become mainstream among G250 companies (68 percent) and fast becoming so among
N100 companies (48 percent), ibid, at 4. The influence of the GRI Guidelines was
reflected by the fact that 40 per cent of the reporters mentioned that the Guidelines were
the tool used by the corporation to decide about the content of the sustainability report;
ibid, at 20.
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regimes and in the context of cross—regimes relationships. Under Article
234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,188 the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") may give preliminary rulings interpreting
European law at the request of any national court. This mechanism was
initially intended to address only questions relating to the validity of
European law. However the ECJ successfully encouraged national courts
to use the mechanism to review the compatibility of national law with
European law. As a result of the preliminary reference mechanism there
have been fewer occasions in which the ECJ has exercised its authority to
review national judicial decisions. Instead, the ECJ's interaction with
national courts has become something akin to judicial dialogue, with
reciprocal learning and exchange of ideas.189
The European model can serve as a template for creating more extensive
dialogue between international tribunals and national courts and possibly
also between different international tribunals. The two regimes that were
discussed in section III – the WTO and the ICC – provide only limited
opportunities for such dialogue. In the ICC treaty the principle that the
Court is to be ‘complementary’ to national criminal proceedings could be
seen as a possible platform for this kind of judicial dialogue. The Rome
Statute provides that the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction if the state is
genuinely willing to carry out the investigation or prosecution of crimes.190
The Statute also outlines processes for judicial review of national court
decisions.191 Formally, the determination as to whether the domestic court
proceedings were independent and impartial lies solely with the ICC itself.
However, such intervention in domestic legal proceedings is likely to
188

Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 26,
2001, O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001), art. 234. Article 234 previously was encompassed in Article
177 of the Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 109.
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prove highly controversial and thus we can expect the Court to be careful
in using this authority.192 It seems that incorporating some form of
preliminary ruling procedure into the ICC treaty could provide more room
for judicial dialogue, while at the same time defusing some of the political
tension associated with the judicial review procedure. The WTO does not
have procedures that could facilitate a constructive dialogue between
national courts and the WTO judicial tribunals (although national courts
play an important role in enforcing sections of the WTO rule-book,
especially in the fields of anti-dumping, intellectual property rights, and
government procurement).193 In both cases, and in particular that of the
WTO, designing procedures that will facilitate an equal-footed dialogue
between national and international courts could contribute to the
reflexivity and legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.194
The conceptual shift from purity to reflexivity asks us then to embrace the
paradoxicality of law. The polymorphosis process seems to mark the end
of the dream of grand global constitutionalism.
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It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the details of such procedures. It is
clear however that in order to facilitate dialogue they should not be designed so as to
merely crystallize the supremacy of the international tribunal. In designing such
dialogical mechanisms we should take into account the fact that the WTO rule-book,
unlike EU law, is not directly applicable within the jurisdictions of most WTO members.
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